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ABSTRACT 
This article critically examines the goal of minimizing transaction
costs, including the costs of legal decision-making.  This goal permeates the
law and economics literature and has profoundly influenced public policy.
While most transaction cost scholarship has focused upon private law, the
minimization goal has influenced proven especially influential in public
law, where it has contributed to a variety of legal changes aimed at reducing
public transaction costs, often through privatization.  
We argue that transaction costs perform useful functions.  They
frequently enable those engaging in transactions to obtain information
needed to correct for information asymmetries or inadequate information.
They facilitate efficient transactions, allow the avoidance of bad
transactions, and serve important equitable goals.           
It follows that lawmakers must take transaction cost functions into
account when deciding whether eliminating them is desirable.  We discuss
how to identify transaction cost functions and how to take these functions
into account in choosing legal rules.  In so doing, we extend the transaction
cost debate, which has focused predominantly on private law, into the
public law arena, or, more precisely, into the debate about the role of
private markets in achieving public values.  While some transaction costs
deserve elimination, we conclude that maintaining or even increasing
transaction costs sometimes makes sense.  We show that viewing all
transaction costs as a simple deadweight loss skews legal theory in both the
public and private realms.   
This article uses the teachings of the Supreme Court’s procedural
due process jurisprudence, institutional economics, and theories focusing
on information to inform analysis of transaction costs.  It examines
transaction costs’ role in both the legal theory and policy-making in a wide
variety of areas, including nuisance law, environmental law, intellectual
property, corporate law, contract and the privatization of social services. 
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THE FUNCTIONS  OF TRANSACTION COSTS:
* J. D. Yale Law School (1989); Professor, Syracuse University College of Law.
** J.D. Stanford Law School (1994); Ph. D. in Economics, University of Michigan
(1988); Associate Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law, SUNY.
1  See  Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 244 (1984) (describing the role of the business lawyer as a
transaction cost engineer);  Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1661, 1685 (1989) (an attorney is “nothing but a transaction cost”).  Cf. Schlag,
supra, at 1685-86 (if market is specified as the market in purchasing knowledge about legal
entitlements, than an attorney’s fee is not a transaction cost).
2 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 867 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(counting attorney’s fees as part of transaction costs in Asbestos litigation).
3 See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment?
A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 410 (1999) (describing the view
that courts should minimize transaction costs as a “usual justification” of “the economist’s
view of transaction costs.”); Schlag, supra note 1, at 1686-87 (conventional treatment of
transaction cost involves treating them as “deadweight losses” that can be eliminated
costlessly).    This negative view of lawyers in the economics literature has its roots in an
empirical  study from the late 1980's finding a negative relation between economic growth
and lawyers per capita.  See STEPHEN P. MCGEE, WILLIAM BROCK & LESLIE YOUNG,
BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 118-121 (1989).
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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers, of all people, should recognize the value of transaction
costs.  After all, lawyers are transaction costs, at least to the people who
pay their fees.1  When two people making a contract, for example, pay
lawyers to draft documents and anticipate potential enforcement problems,
the lawyers’ fees constitute transaction costs.2
Yet lawyers- including academic lawyers - seem strangely
unanimous in arguing that transaction costs are bads that should be
minimized or even eliminated.3  This death wish for lawyers slavishly
mimics the writing of some economists, but not of many of those who think
4 See, e.g., John Joseph Wallis & Douglass C. North, Should Transaction Costs Be
Subtracted From Gross National Product?, 48 J. Econ. Hist.  651, 654 (1988) (disputing
view of transaction cost as waste); Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private
Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 306,
310 (1999) (discussing writers who have questioned view that transaction cost
considerations should dominate all other considerations); DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 744 (1991) (“transactions tend to be ‘placed’ in a way that
maximizes the net benefits of what they provide, including the costs of the transaction”).
5 See Section I.A., infra.
6 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades:
Success or Failure, 112 YALE L. J. 829, 865 (2003) (economic scholarship assumes that
individuals are rational and have unlimited cognitive capacity).  Ironically, Ronald Coase,
the most widely cited economist in the neoclassical law and economics literature that often
ignores transaction cost, sought throughout his career to persuade economists to consider
the real world, meaning the world that has transaction costs.  See, e.g., RONALD COASE,
THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 15 (1988) [hereinafter THE MARKET] (“What my
argument does suggest is the need to introduce positive transaction costs explicitly into
economic analysis so that we can study the world that exists.”); Ronald Coase, The
Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AMER. ECON. REV. 713, 717 (1992) (emphasizing
the “pressing need” to “study the world of positive transaction costs”); Ronald Coase, The
Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AMER. ECON. REV. 192, 195 (1964) (study of “an
optimal system . . . has been pernicious”, because “[i]t has directed economists’ attention
from” studying “how alternative arrangements will actually work in practice.”); Guido
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, 100 YALE L. J. 1211, 1211-1212 (1991)
(emphasizing the centrality of transaction costs in Coase’s work and elucidating its
implications for legal theory).  Cf. Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The
Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and for-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L.S.
L. REV. 457, 471 (1996) (“A frictionless market does . . . exist in the real world.”).
7 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 26-27
(2002) (defining transaction costs as “dead weight losses that reduce efficiency”).
most carefully about transaction costs.4  The law reviews and much of the
economic literature are full of statements, in a wide variety of contexts,
about the need to limit the category of costs upon which most lawyers
depend for a living.5   
The view that transaction costs should always be reduced has
played a key role in supporting a movement toward greater reliance upon
free markets both in legal practice and in theory.  For many years the
imaginary world of perfect competition, perfect information, and zero
transaction costs has dominated legal theory.6  From this vantage point,
transaction costs appeared as impediments to efficient transactions,
deserving of elimination if at all possible.7  This view has made not only
made transaction cost
[3/17/04 Draft]                    THE FUNCTIONS  OF TRANSACTION COSTS 2
8 See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity:  Some Causes Consequences and Cures, 42
DUKE L. J. 1, 18 n. 69 (1992) (calling  “analysis of how transaction costs affect legal rules.
. . a pillar of modern legal scholarship”).  See also Schlag, supra note 1, at 1662 (claiming
that transaction costs play a “significant role” in “Chicago law and economics”). 
9 See, e.g., infra notes 90-91and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2001) (approving a
settlement partly to reduce transaction costs and leave more resources available for
cleanup); United States v. Charter International Oil Company, 83 F.3d 510, 520 (1st Cir.
1996) (approving settlement despite dispute about scope of immunity from contribution
actions in part because Congress favored settlements as a means of reducing transaction
costs); United States v. DiBiase, 45 F.3d 541, 545-46 (1st Cir. 1995) (refusing to reject
settlement alleged to unfairly discount the liability of a party, because settlements reduce
transaction costs, “thereby preserving scarce resources . . . for . . . cleanup”); United States
v. Kramer, 19 F.Supp.2d 273, 290 (D.N..J. 1998) (upholding settlement that serves
“CERCLA’s goal of reducing litigation and transaction costs.”); Seneca Meadows, Inc. v.
ECI Liquidating, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 255, 259 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that private party
may not bring a cost recovery claim, because doing so would augment transaction costs);
Adhesives Research, Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1244
(M.D.Pa. 1996) (allowing private cost recovery action, because of concern that the
transaction costs involved in a contribution action might otherwise discourage voluntary
cleanup); United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22573, *14-15
(M.D.Pa.) (approving EPA authority to enter into “de micromis” settlements that prevent
imposition of transaction costs upon small contributors grossly disproportionate to their
potential liability); Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662, 681
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (prohibiting PRP’s cost recovery action, because of concern about
increasing transaction costs); United States v. Asarco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 955-57
(D.Co. 1993) (declining to authorize cost recovery action against settling parties lest
transaction costs rise); Hudson Insurance Co. v. American Electric Corp., 748 F. Supp.
837, 843 (M.D. Flor. 1990) (explaining that making every company self-insure would
produce more transaction costs than having expert insurers set premiums in a decision
rejecting jurisdiction to create a federal common law of insurance for CERCLA liability
claims)  See also Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that
transaction costs might interfere with emissions trading equalizing control costs between
states ordered to clean up through an interstate emissions program).
11 See, e.g., infra notes 103-169 and accompanying text.
12 This point by itself is not new.  See Wallis & North, supra note 4, at 654 (claiming
that transaction costs produce corollary benefits).  Cf. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 98-122
(1994) (arguing that legal scholars should consider transaction benefits along with
transaction costs).  See also NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001) (elaborating Komesar’s views about how to
(continued...)
reduction “a pillar of modern legal scholarship”8 but also influenced
Congress,9 courts,10 and agencies,11 leading to many legal reforms aimed at
reducing transaction costs.     
We argue that people and institutions paying lawyers’ fees or other
transaction costs obtain something of value.12  They often pay transaction
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12(...continued)
analyze institutional choice without further elaboration of transaction benefits).  Our
contribution involves elaboration and application of North’s basic insight about corollary
benefits.  This elaboration also carries forward Komesar’s work on comparative
institutional analysis.  
13 Cf. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1220 (arguing that Pareto superior moves eliminating
transaction costs are unlikely to exist).  
14 See infra notes 24-55 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 63-112 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
costs to purchase information that will help them evaluate a proposed
transaction.  People acquire this information because the information has
functional value to them.  We identify three transaction cost functions that
motivate these expenditures.  Transaction costs expenditures help avoid
inefficient transactions, bring about otherwise impossible efficient
transactions, or help improve the equity of transactions.  While transaction
costs have usually been viewed as impediments to efficient transactions, we
argue that they often aid realization of efficient transactions that would
never occur without them.  Recognition of the functions transaction costs
perform casts doubts on the view that policy reforms should always seek
to reduce, or if possible, eliminate transaction costs.  We argue that
recommendations to reduce or eliminate transaction costs must consider the
impact of reductions of transaction costs upon corollary benefits.
We admit the possibility that some transactions costs might prove
wasteful and deserve elimination.  But usually transaction costs
expenditures will produce some corollary benefit13 that analysts must
consider in addressing arguments to reduce transaction costs.
Our analysis aids consideration of transaction cost minimization
arguments not only in the private law context, but also in the public law
context.  Although most of the transaction cost legal scholars have focused
their attention upon contracts, nuisance law, and other private law areas,14
we show that recommendations to reduce transaction costs have influenced
public law at least as much as private law.15 
Our framework contributes to the analysis of institutional choice,
such as the decision about whether to employ government or market
solutions to problems.  Thus, it applies to ongoing debates about the
appropriate scope of “privatization” of government functions.16  In both
public and private law, the focus on transaction cost minimization has
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17 See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and
the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1413-1417 (1995-96); Sidney
A. Shapiro, Matching Public Ends and Private Means: Insights from the New Institutional
Economics, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 43, 45-47, 48-53  (2002) (employing
institutional economics to analyze the question of accountability for private actors
performing public functions).
18 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 6, at 875-877 (discussing bounded rationality and
transaction costs as explanation for the failure of economic models to “predict” the content
of contracts).
19 Professor Rubin has argued that institutional economics has the potential to unite
legal discourse.  While transaction costs play a major role in institutional economics,
Professor Rubin says little about them.  See Rubin, supra note 17, at 1414-1415.  His
article offers a generalized treatment of the potential of institutional economics as a mode
of legal discourse, rather than a detailed theory of how to analyze transaction costs.
Professor Schlag does provide legal theoretical treatment of transaction costs.  See
Schlag, supra note 1 at 1672-1687.  He emphasizes the inadequacy of current treatment of
transaction costs, see id. at 1699, but says little about how to improve it.  We remain more
agnostic about the general value of transaction cost analysis than Schlag.  We offer a less
critical and more constructive perspective, without necessarily denying the validity of any
of Schlag’s insights.  While he focused on the indeterminancy of the transaction cost
concept, we offer a definition appropriate to legal theory and a functional theory that might
make transaction cost analysis more useful to legal practice and theory.   
20 A nice example from Supreme Court litigation illustrates the prevalence and
importance of transaction costs.  In oral argument before the court on December 9, 2002,
Walter Dellinger stated: “[A] world without transaction costs doesn’t exist in a Milky
Way.”  He was countering the argument by Charles Fried that his client the Washington
Legal Foundation was entitled to compensation equal to the amount of interest on client
funds that was taken by the IOLTA program.  Professor Dellinger’s response was that
Professor Fried was assuming zero transaction costs for the bank. When these transaction
costs were considered, compensation would be zero.  See Method of Legal Services
Financing is Challenged Before Supreme Court,   THE  N.Y. TIMES , December 10, 2002,
at A32.
supported arguments for greater reliance on private markets to solve
problems.     
This article aids legal scholarship by contributing to the ongoing
movement to incorporate the insights of institutional economics into legal
theory.  Transaction cost economics has gained ground among economists
and prominent legal scholars have argued that institutional economics,
which focuses upon transaction cost issues, provides a fruitful framework
for legal academic work.17  Some of the most sophisticated recent writing
in the law and economics literature discusses transaction cost problems.18
But this literature lacks sufficient generalized treatment of the impact
transaction costs should have upon legal theory.19  This article begins to fill
this void.20    
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21  See Schlag, supra note 1, at 1674 (characterizing the definition of transaction costs
as “elusive and contested”); Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON 233, 233 (1979) (the concept of transaction costs
“wants for definition”).  See also Cento Veljanovski, The Coase theorem and the Economic
Theory of Markets and Law, 35 KYKLOS 53, 57 (1982) (stating that there “is no theory of
transaction costs”).
22 See generally Paul L Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and
Remedies, 18 J. L. & ECON. & ORG. 95, 97 (2002) (transaction cost economic theory has
been extended beyond firms and markets to aid understanding of government entities);
Williamson, supra note 4, at 307 (viewing public agency as a flawed organizational entity
in which transaction costs are featured).
23 See GEORGE  AKERLOF, AN ECONOMIC THEORIST’S BOOK OF TALES: ESSAYS THAT
ENTERTAIN THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEW ASSUMPTIONS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 7-22
(1984)(presenting economic theory of lemons).  Professor Akerlof, along with Professors
Joseph Stiglitz and Michael Spence, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in
2001.  See John Hilsenrath, Three Americans Win Nobel for Economics–Citing Faulty
Information, They Challenge Theory of Efficient Markets, THE WALL STREET J., Oct. 11,
2001, at A2.
The first part of the article shows the pervasiveness of the
transaction cost minimization goal in both private and public law.  Despite
the ubiquity of the transaction cost minimization goal, definitions of the
term “transaction cost” vary.21  We provide a working definition that makes
the concept useful for both public and private law. 22
   
The second part explains the functions transaction costs play.
Parties often pay transaction costs to overcome problems of asymmetric
information (such as a used car dealer having better information about his
cars than a prospective purchaser), the subject of recent Nobel Prize
winning work in economics.23  Payers of transaction costs obtain
information that enables them to avoid inefficient transactions, realize
opportunities for efficient transactions unavailable without sufficient
transaction cost expenditures, and make transactions (defined broadly)
more equitable. 
The third part explores the implications of these transaction cost
functions for legal and economic theory.  Simple recommendations to
eliminate or reduce transaction costs are usually irresponsible.  While
wasteful transaction costs exist and deserve elimination, they may be rare.
When transaction costs perform a vital function, retaining them is
frequently important, to the extent that they perform the crucial functions
this article identifies.  This part explains how one can use information
theory as a basis for analyzing transaction cost functions.  This approach
will facilitate careful comparative institutional analysis as the basis for
addressing transaction cost problems. 
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24 See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, in  COASE, THE MARKET, supra note 6, at
114-115 (“a rearrangement [of legal rights] will be made through the market whenever this
would lead to an increase in the value of production”).
25 Coase analyzes several well known nuisance cases in his exposition of the problem
of social cost, such as Fountainbleu Hotel Corp. v.  Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 114 So.
2d 357 (1959), Sturges v. Bridgman, 1 Ch. D. 852 (1879), and Delta Air Corporation v.
Kersey, 20 S.E. 2d 245 (S. Ct. Ga. 1942).  See Coase, supra note 6, at 104-105, 168.  
  Coase’s influence on nuisance and other land use cases, as well as cases in ordinary
negligence, persists today.  See, e.g., Los Angeles County, MTA v. Continental
Development Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 824 (Cal. S. Ct. 1997) (emphasizing the effect on a new
setoff rule on minimizing transaction costs); Tazian v. Kline, 673 N.E. 2d 485, 490 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996) (transaction cost minimizing role of undivided ownership considered in an
action for quiet title); Walgreen Company v. Sara Creek Property Company, B.V., 966 F.2d
273, 274 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing to Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost in a landlord-tenant
dispute); Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National Marine, Inc. v. Lemont Harbor and Fleeting
Services, Inc., 984 F. 2d 880, 889 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing to Coase’s The Problem of Social
Cost in a negligence suit involving a barge).
I.  TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE MINIMIZATION GOAL
The goal of reducing or eliminating transaction costs has strongly
influenced both scholarship and public policy.   But despite the ubiquity of
the goal, the literature uses inconsistent and widely varying definitions of
transaction costs. In this section, we demonstrate the ubiquity of the
transaction cost reduction goal and discuss the problem of defining
transaction cost.
A. THE TRANSACTION COST MINIMIZATION GOAL
1.  PRIVATE LAW
Transaction cost minimization has played a major role in the legal
theory of private law.  We begin with the most prominent and familiar
example.
a.  THE LAW OF NUISANCE
Ronald Coase’s article, The Problem of Social Cost, claimed that
absent transaction costs, landowners would agree to an efficient solution to
nuisance problems - interferences with the use or enjoyment of land -,
regardless of the regime for legal rights.24  If a court made an inefficient
decision in a nuisance case, for example, the parties could simply bargain
around it, absent transaction costs, claimed Coase.25   Subsequently, Guido
Calabresi and Douglas Melahmed pointed out that courts can choose
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26 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
27 See id. at 1092.
28 See id. at 1093.
29 See, e.g., Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L. J. 1027 (1995); Keith N. Hylton, A
Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977 (1996); Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 713 (1996) Ian Ayres and J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L. J. 703 (1996);  James E. Krier and Stewart
J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 440 (1995); Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L. J. 2149 (1997); Richard Epstein, A Clear View of the
Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L. J. 2091 (1997).
30 For a brief discussion of the debate, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 55-56 (6th ed. 2002)(“What is fundamental [to the assignment of legal rights] is the
distinction between settings of low transaction costs and of high transaction costs”). See
also Carol Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L. J. 2175, 2178-82 (1997).
(distinguishing between Type I transaction costs that are incurred prior to bargaining and
Type II transaction costs that arise after bargaining has begun).  
31 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 82-87 (2000).
between a property rule and a liability rule.26  A property rule usually
protects an entitlement (such as the right to be free of noise) through
injunction, meaning that the state may not take the entitlement away
without the owner’s consent.27   A liability rule usually protects an
entitlement through damages, meaning that this rule allows the state to
deprive the rights holder of her entitlement without her consent, if the
person working the deprivation pays objectively adequate compensation.28
A long line of scholarship has followed about how to choose between
property and liability rules.29  Much of this scholarship applies Coase’s idea
of bargaining around legal rules to reach an efficient solution to the
problem of choosing between property and liability rules.  Scholars debate
which rule creates the least transaction costs, and therefore the least
impediment to bargaining around inefficient judicial decisions.30
Implicitly, these scholars endorse the view that the choice between property
and liability rules should reduce the transaction costs of bargaining around
judicial decisions.  
Professors Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen make this link between
the Coase theorem and the transaction cost minimization goal more explicit
in their often cited textbook, Law and Economics.31  They present what they
call the Positive Coase Theorem and the Normative Coase Theorem, both
distilled from Coase’s Social Cost article.   The Positive Coase Theorem
states that “if transaction costs are zero, an efficient allocation of resources
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32 Id. at 85.
33 Id.  at 93.
34  While Professor Gilson does not provide a specific definition of transaction costs,
his examples of transaction cost engineering illustrate that the corporate lawyer’s primary
goal is to facilitate the acquisition, transfer, and interpretation of information between an
acquirer of a corporate asset and its seller.   Professor Gilson describes the corporate
lawyer’s role as one of ensuring that financial assets are measured accurately according to
the terms of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  Under CAPM, as characterized by
Professor Gilson, assets will be priced correctly if there is homogenous information,
consistent time horizon, no transaction costs, and costless information acquisition.  The
primary transaction costs that corporate lawyers must contend with are ones that arise from
imperfect and incomplete information.   More importantly, it would be a misstatement to
see the corporate lawyer’s role as one of minimizing transaction costs.  As transaction cost
engineers, corporate lawyers are facilitators; they manage transaction costs rather than
minimize them.  See Gilson, supra note 1, at 253-256.
35 It should be emphasized that Professor Gilson’s argument is not that the benefits of
lawyers outweigh their costs or that the costs of undertaking a transaction are lower with
a lawyer than without.  In some ways, there may be a presumption that transaction costs
are reduced.  But the keystone of the argument is that lawyers provide certain functions in
light of transaction costs and that these functions benefit transactions.   The argument is not
that lawyers are necessarily effective reducers of transaction costs when all benefits and
costs are taken into consideration.   What lawyers do is tap in the need for certain markets
necessary for the creation and dissemination of information about corporate acquisitions.
By establishing such a market, corporate lawyers provide a service that facilitates other
transactions.  See Gilson, supra note 1, at 254-256 (describing role of business lawyers as
(continued...)
results from private bargaining, regardless of the initial assignment of
property rights.”32   The Normative Coase Theorem states that lawmakers
should structure the law “so as to remove the impediments to private
agreement,” that is to minimize transaction costs.33  Thus, the Normative
Coase Theorem calls for transaction cost minimization.   
Because of the central role this line of scholarship has played in
legal theory, this use of the transaction cost minimization rationale alone
would demonstrate the importance of the assumption that minimization is
always desirable.  But its influence extends far beyond the place of its birth.
  
b. Corporate and Commercial Law
The transaction cost minimization goal has also played a role in
corporate and commercial law.  Ronald Gilson argued that business lawyers
are “transaction cost engineers” - people who work to minimize transaction
costs.34  Relying principally upon examples from mergers and acquisitions,
Gilson used the desirability of transaction cost reduction to explain how
business lawyers add value to these sorts of commercial transactions.35
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35(...continued)
value creators by allowing for more accurate asset pricing); 254 n. 39 (describing how
business lawyers solve technical “legal” problems whose implementation may become
delegated to lower cost professionals).
36 Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 ORE.
L. REV. 239, 241-242 (1995).   Although her analysis rests heavily on the work of Professor
Gilson, the situation of Silicon Valley lawyers is very different from that of corporate
lawyers structuring corporate acquisitions and aiding in the valuation of corporate assets.
 The Silicon Valley lawyer’s role is partly that of a facilitator of corporate acquisitions, but
more often she serves in the identification and capture of intellectual property assets.  This
distinction is important because it is not necessarily the case that the capital asset pricing
model that Gilson uses to analyze corporate acquisitions would suffice to describe all that
Silicon Valley lawyers do.  The model was developed to understand the pricing of
corporate securities and not intangible assets such as intellectual property. 
37 See Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value-Adding
Contracts: A Contract Lawyer’s View of the Law and Economics Literature, 74 Ore. L.
Rev. 189, 195-205 (1995) (extending Gilson’s transaction cost engineering role of
corporate lawyers to commercial and contract lawyers more broadly).
38 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: an
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 91 (1989). 
39 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 204 ("Supplying an Omitted Essential Term")
(setting default for missing term to be "a term which is reasonable in the circumstances");
Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 Cornell
L. Rev. 785, 785 n.2 (1985).
Scholars have explored the corporate lawyer’s role as a transaction
cost engineer in contexts other than that of corporate acquisitions.  For
example, Professor Lisa Bernstein has written about how Silicon Valley
lawyers minimize transaction costs associated with the identification and
acquisition of intellectual property assets in conjunction with disposition
of venture capital.36
 
The goal of reducing transaction costs not only dominates academic
explanations of the role of business attorneys  in organizing private
transactions in the capital markets, but also plays a prominent role in
justifying the fundamental rules of corporate and commercial law.37    For
example, scholars have employed transaction cost minimization rationales
to explain choices between  “immutable” and “default” rules in corporate
and commercial law.38  Courts frequently employ default rules to
supplement incomplete private bargains with default contract terms not
contemplated by the parties.  For example, to resolve a dispute regarding
a commercial contract for goods lacking a price term, a court will often
insert, by default, a “reasonable” price.39  By contrast, immutable rules
flatly prohibit enforcement of certain kinds of bargains.  So, for example,
a court will not enforce a real estate contract lacking a price term.  An
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40 See, e.g., Travelco, Inc. v. Chain Locations of America, Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d 763, 763
(N.Y.A.D. 3rd Dept. 1991) (lack of price term made contract for sale of real property
unenforceable); Aceste v. Wiebusch, 425 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (N.Y.A.D. 2nd Dept.
1980)(price term not sufficiently definite in real property contract). But see Shayeb v.
Holland, 73 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Mass. 1947) (court implying a reasonable price term in an
unusual case involving option contract for purchase of real property).  For the treatment of
price terms in contracts for the sale of goods, see UCC § 2-303(1997).  Other examples of
immutable rules include the rule that contracts require consideration and that corporations
enjoy limited liability.   See, e.g. Cloud Corporation v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d. 289, 294 (7th
Cir. 2002) (UCC 2-207 minimizes transaction costs “by eliminating a negotiation over an
additional term unless the offeror is unwilling to accede to the offeree’s desire”). 
41 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 38, at 91.
42 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligations 69 VA. L.REV. 967, 971 (1983) ("Ideally, the
preformulated rules supplied by the state should mimic the agreements contracting parties
would reach were they costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction."). 
43 See Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A. 2d 1019, 1021 n.4  (Del. Sup. Ct. 2001) (stating
that majoritarian rules are desirable because they reduce transaction costs unless penalty
defaults are needed to force information disclosure).
44 See  Ayres &  Gertner, supra note 38, at 91-93.  See generally Moreau v. Harris
County, 158 F. 3d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Ayres & Gertner for the proposition that
default rules should be chosen for efficient and fair results in the majority of cases, rather
than fairness or efficient results vis a vis the parties before the court).
immutable rule requires a price term in the real estate context, while a
default rule supplies one in a contract for the purchase of goods.40  Scholars
usually favor the rule that best minimizes transaction costs.41     
The goal of transaction cost minimization also figures prominently
in explanations of choices between available default rules.  For example,
scholars often urge legislatures and courts to adopt a majoritarian default
rule, in other words, a rule imposing contract terms that most parties would
agree upon under similar circumstances.42  The contract rule of a reasonable
price as the default rule may offer an example of a majoritarian default rule.
On the other hand, courts often employ penalty default rules, such as the
rule that courts construe ambiguities against the drafter of a contract.43
Such a rule supplies terms that penalize one of the parties to a contract.
Some scholars argue that a majoritarian default rule would reflect the term
that a majority of contracting parties would adopt, absent transaction
costs.44  The majoritarian default rule presumes that high transaction costs
caused the failure to negotiate over a term.  The court minimizes
transaction costs by imputing a default term.  Scholars sometimes disagree
about which rule choice facilitates transaction cost reduction, but many
agree that the goal of transaction cost minimization should play a
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45 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 29, at 1033 (discussing divergence of opinions on
high versus low transaction costs); Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L. J. 1489, 1514-1517
(1999) (discussing the size of transaction costs and imposition of rules of contractual
recovery) Ayres & Gertner supra note 38, at 113 (contesting argument that parties will
bargain around a default rule  if transaction costs are low).
46 Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107).
47 17 U.S.C. § 107.
48 Id.
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g. Educational Testing Service v. Stanley H. Kaplan Educ. Ctr., Inc., 965 F.
Supp. 731, 736 (D. Md. 1997)(describing fair use as an equitable rule of reason). Cf.
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1668-1669 (1988)(discussing changing role of fair use as an equitable doctrine).
51  See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
52 Id. at 1604-1605.
substantial role in choosing the fundamental rules of commercial and
corporate law.45  
c. Fair Use and Copyright
Transaction cost minimization has played a central role in shaping
the fair use doctrine in copyright.  In the fair use provision of the Copyright
Act of 1976,46 Congress authorized users of copyrighted materials to copy
them without paying the copyright holders under limited circumstances.47
Under this provision, the law sanctions an activity that is otherwise
copyright infringement, if the activity falls into a particular category of use,
such as criticism, research, or scholarship, and this use is deemed fair.48
The statute provides four factors to consider in determining fairness: (1) the
nature of the use, (2) the nature of the work infringed, (3) the amount of the
infringed work taken, and (4) effect on the potential market for the
infringed work.49  Since the passage of the 1976 Act, courts and
commentators have struggled to fashion from this  multi-part list of factors
a predictable set of rules that allow users to know what uses are “fair” and
which violate the Copyright Act.50 
A very important article by Wendy Gordon relied in part on a
transaction cost minimization rationale to create guidance for courts on
how to apply the fair use doctrine.51   Professor Gordon argued that the
existence of market failure should count as a justification for considering
a use fair.52  Market failure can occur, explains Gordon, because in some
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53 Id. at 1609 (fair use as facilitating a transfer of resources that would otherwise be
blocked by high transaction costs).
54 Id. at 1610.
55 Id. at 1621.
56 Grounded in transaction costs economics, Professor Gordon’s approach to fair use
emphasizes three factors: (a) the existence of market failure for the use of the copyrighted
work, (b) the benefits and costs of the use, and (c) the effects of permitting uncompensated
uses of the copyrighted work on the incentive to create.   Copying of a copyright protected
work should be permitted when there is market failure, when there are net benefits from
the copying, and the uncompensated copying does not diminish the incentive to create.  Id.
at 1615-1622.   For example, copying of a page of a book for classroom purposes would
be fair use under Professor Gordon’s approach.  There is a market failure in this situation
because the user may not have the time or the ability to obtain permission from the
copyright owner.   Further, the benefits derived from disseminating the work for classroom
use outweighs any loss of revenue to the copyright owner.  Finally, such permitted copying
does not diminish incentives to create because the copyright owner can still market her
work in other ways.  Id. at 1628-1630.  To consider another example, making unauthorized
copies of videotapes would not be fair use because (1) an active market for the sale of
videotapes exist and hence there is no market failure, (2) the only benefit from such activity
is the savings from purchasing an authorized video, and (3) the unauthorized sales deeply
cut into the market for the copyright owner and arguably creates disincentives to create.
Id. at 1654-1657.
57 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.1994).
cases transaction costs exceed the value of the work to the user.53  In such
a case, no market would exist for a particular use, because the user would
respond to a requirement to pay for a license by simply abandoning the
use.54     For example, copying of a page of a book for classroom purposes
might be fair use under Professor Gordon’s approach.  There is a market
failure in this situation if the user does not have the time or the ability to
obtain permission from the copyright owner.55  Thus, Professor Gordon’s
market failure point suggests that fair use avoids excessive transaction
costs, and therefore constitutes another instance of a regime justification
that relies upon the transaction cost minimization goal.  
The courts have made transaction cost minimization even more
central to fair use than Professor Gordon recommends.  Professor Gordon
offers a balanced and nuanced analysis of fair use.  She does not argue that
“market failure” should be the sole criterion governing fair use.56  A
number of courts have adopted a transaction cost approach to fair use,
borrowing  either directly or indirectly from Professor Gordon.  But they,
unlike Gordon, have sometimes employed a transaction cost minimization
framework to the exclusion of other factors.  For example, the Second
Circuit in American Geophysical v. Texaco,57 held that unauthorized
copying of scientific articles for research purposes was not fair use because
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58 Id. at 918.
59 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000).
60 Id. at 1114.
61 Id. at 1119 n.2 (citing Professor Gordon).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1120-1121.
it interfered with an active market for licenses for photocopying of
articles.58  The Ninth Circuit makes a similar analytical move in World
Wide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God,59   a case involving
the rights of an offshoot faction of a church to photocopy the church’s
official bible.60  The court concluded that the offshoot faction’s
photocopying of the official bible did not constitute fair use because the
church was planning to publish an annotated version of the bible and
therefore there was no market failure for distribution of the bible.61  The
majority in the World Wide Church of God case finds that the existence of
markets shows that the transaction costs associated with bargaining for a
license are not too high.62  Since the need for transaction cost minimization
does not justify exclusion of licensing, the court finds no justification for
fair use.63  
The transaction cost minimization goal has influenced nuisance,
commercial law, corporate law, and intellectual property.  Still, it’s
influence has proven perhaps even stronger in the realm of public law.   
2.  PUBLIC LAW 
Transaction cost minimization has profoundly influenced legal
scholarship in private law areas, but has had less visibility in public law
scholarship.  In the public law area, however, transaction cost minimization
goals have played a major role in legislative reforms, court rulings, and
administrative decisions.  Accordingly, legal scholarship should address
transaction cost minimization in the public law context. 
a.  Workers’ Compensation and Other Public Benefit
Programs
The desire to reduce transaction costs has played a major role in
workers’ compensation.  Transaction cost explanations plays a prominent
role in scholarly justifications for the existence of the regime.  Scholars
have claimed that the 19th century tort system compensated workers for
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64 See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation
“Reform,” 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 669 (1998) (tort defenses of assumption of risk, the
fellow-servant doctrine, and contributory negligence often prevented compensation of
injured industrial workers at common law); Arthur Lawson, The Nature and Origin’s of
Workmen’s Compensation, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 206, 228 (1951-52) (studies preceding
enactment of workers’ compensation statutes showed little compensation for workers under
common law).
65 See McCluskey, supra note 63, at 737  (“worker’s compensation is typically
described as efficient . . .on the ground that it” generates less transaction cost than the tort
system).
66  See id. at 738 (“recent cost containment reforms in workers’ comp are widely
described as reducing transaction costs”).
67 See id. at 863.
68 See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 308, 326 (1985)
(fees for attorneys in veteran benefits cases limited to $10.00 to assure that veteran need
not pay for attorneys with benefits money and that proceedings remain simple); U.S. Dep't
of Labor v. Triplett, 494  U.S. 715, 718 (1990) (regulations forbid contractual arrangements
for fee).
69 See Walters, 473 U.S. at 308 (describing attorney fee restrictions that limit lawyer
involvement in veterans’ benefit decisions).
70  See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 718 (describing restrictions on attorney participation in
Black Lung Disease compensation programs).
injuries only erratically and after expensive litigation.64  By providing more
certain compensation for worker injuries regardless of employer fault, the
adoption of workers’ compensation in the early 20th century eliminated
transaction costs associated with tort remedies.65  
More recently, policy makers and some scholars have sought to
justify “cost containment” reforms on the grounds that they reduce
transaction costs.66  These reforms limit both the size of attorneys’ fees and
the ability of claimants to shift these costs to insurers or employers.67  The
desire to minimize transaction costs plays a significant role in worker’s
compensation reform, just as it plays a significant role in some scholarly
theories about its creation.
The federal government, like the states administering worker’s
compensation programs, has sought to contain the cost of public benefit
programs by limiting attorney fees.68  The Supreme Court has addressed
controversial rules restricting attorney fees in veterans’ programs,69 and in
a federal Black Lung Disease compensation program70.     
Transaction cost concerns have played a role in all manner of
decisions to privatize government delivery of social services, lessen their
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71 See E.S. Savas, Privatization and the New Public Management, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 1731, 1736 (2001) (identifying transaction cost considerations with “New Public
Management” and privatization); ELLIOT  SCLAR, YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU
PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 96 (2000) (applying transaction cost theory
to the privatization debate).
72 See POSNER, supra note 30, 71 at 477-478 (discussing transaction cost in Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program);  Mathew Diller, Going Private-The Future
of Social Welfare Policy, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 491, 493 (2002) (the technocratic case
for privatization rests upon view that government suffers from too much “red tape” and that
privatization promises “leaner” service delivery).  
73 See, e.g., DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPENEURIAL SPIRIT IT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 23 (1992) (advocating
changing bureaucratic institutions into “entrepreneurial institutions” in order to “melt the
fat”); Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1868-1891
(2002) (discussing cost, quality and accountability in private prisons) [hereinafter, Prisons].
74 See Martha T. McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform, in
FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS ____ (Martha A. Fineman & Terence
Dougherty eds., forthcoming  2003) (criticizing this argument).  Cf. Linda C. McClain,
Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1673,  1686 n.40 (2001) (arguing for the promotion of care, including care
of children, as a pubic value); Linda C. McClain, Citizenship Begins at Home: The New
Social Contract and Working Families, in PROGRESSIVE POLITICS IN THE GLOBAL AGE 95-
107 (Henry Tam ed., 2001) (same).
75  Privatization embraces a variety of government approaches that give the private
sector a greater role in government.  See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and
Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1507, 1519-53 (2001) (developing a privatization
typology). 
76 See SCLAR, supra note ?, at 47 (privatization proponents often presume that the
public sector is “awash in inefficiency”).
77 See Diller, supra note 71, at 498-503 (describing the initiative and its goals).
scope, or devolve fundamental policy choices to the states.71  In these cases,
the government and scholars disapprove of the government transaction
costs that attend the delivery of benefits.72  They  privatize a function or
reduce the scope of a social welfare program, in part, in order to reduce
these costs.73  For example, advocates of welfare reform suggest  that
reducing transaction costs preventing employment - transportation, child
care, information about jobs - offers a more fruitful approach than simply
redistributing income to the poor.74  And advocates of devolution and
privatization75 have claimed that these measures drastically reduce
administrative costs - which we consider a public transaction cost.76 
President Bush’s faith-based initiative - an effort to rely upon religious
charities to deliver some social services - provides an example of this sort
of reform.77      
b.  Environmental Law
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78 42 U.S.C. §§ 9610-9675.
79 See Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the
Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (1994).
80 See id. at 1046 n. 17; Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under
CERCLA:  A Normative Analysis, 20 ENVT’L AFF. 579, 585 (1993) (discussing the
magnitude of the hazardous waste disposal problem at the time of CERCLA’s enactment
and a little over a decade later). 
81 See, e.g., State of New York v. Solvent Chemical Co., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 90
(W.D.N.Y. 1998) (adjudicating motion to add 52 waste generators and third party
defendants to a Superfund case based on activities going back as long as 40 years).  See
also U.S. v. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993, 1010  (W.D.N.Y.
1994) (Hooker chemical company placed chemicals in Love Canal site from the early
1940s to 1954); Kenneth S. Abraham, Essay: The Maze of Mega-Coverage Litigation, 97
Colum. L. Rev. 2102, 2104 (1997) (“a typical CERCLA liability might involve waste that
was deposited beginning in 1955.”) 
82 See, e.g., Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir.
1997) (discussing solvent parties’ liability for “orphan shares” of liability left by defunct
companies); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Min. Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1303-1304 (9th
Cir. 1997) (declining to allow PRPs to obtain all of its response costs from defendant PRPs,
so as to preserve possibility of equitably apportioning liability for orphan shares);
KATHERINE N. PROBST & PAUL R. PORTNEY, ASSIGNING LIABILITY FOR SUPERFUND
CLEANUPS: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS 27 (1992) (explaining that the insolvency
or disappearance of PRPs leaves liability for orphan shares with remaining PRPs or the
Trust Fund). 
The goal of reducing transaction costs figures prominently in policy
debates about environment legal problems.  We examine two examples,
debates about prevention and cleanup of hazardous waste and debates about
the design of emissions trading programs.
(1)  SUPERFUND
Perhaps the most conspicuous example of the minimization goal’s
influence involves the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund)78.
Congress enacted this law to address the problem of hazardous waste
sites.79  By 1980, Congress had learned that many parcels of land contained
large deposits of harmful chemicals, which might, if not cleaned up,
contaminate water supplies or otherwise threaten human health and the
environment.80  Many of these sites had received wastes for a long period
of time from a wide variety of individuals and firms.81  Often contributors
to the mess had disappeared or become insolvent.82    
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83 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
84 See id.  The statute only creates liability for past owners who owned a property at
the time somebody disposed of waste on that property.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
Because of broad statutory definitions of disposal, many previous owners might find
themselves liable under this provision.  See, e.g., Nurad v. William E. Hooper & Sons, 966
F.2d 837, 840 (4th Cir. 1992) (liability extends to owners at the time that previously
deposited wastes leaks or spills out onto the land).  Cf. United States v. CDMG Realty, 96
F3d. 706, 711 (3rd Cir. 1996) (rejecting liability for ownership during a time of “passive
migration” of previously deposited waste).  
85 26 U.S.C. §§ 4661; 4671; 59A; 9507(b)(1).  See Rena I. Steinzor, The
Reauthorization of Superfund: The Public Works Alternative, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10078, 10086 (1995) (discussing the amounts raised by various taxes supporting
Superfund). 
86 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1); 9606(a); 9607(a); 9622(a).  EPA can secure PRP
cooperation through either voluntary agreement or administrative orders.  See Organ, supra
note 78, at 1056-57.  See also Oswald, supra note 79, at 588 (summarizing the remedies
and documenting some of the regulatory sources governing details).
87 See, e.g., William N. Hedeman, Jonathan Z. Cannon, and David M. Friedland,
Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme,
21 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10413, 10426 (1991) (calling for “fundamental reform”
to address transaction cost problems).
88 See id. at 10414.
Congress addressed this problem by establishing comprehensive
liability for cleanup costs for a host of “potentially responsible parties”
(PRPs).83  The PRPs included current owners of waste sites, some previous
owners, persons who had arranged for disposal of waste at the site, and
transporters of hazardous waste.84  
Congress created a “Superfund,” financed by taxation of the
chemical and petrochemical industry, to fund cleanup of the dirtiest sites.85
It authorized EPA to cleanup these sites with Superfund monies and bill the
PRPs for the cost or to have the PRPs cleanup.86 
CERCLA has endured frequent and fervent criticism as a generator
of high transaction costs, including the costs of investigation, negotiation,
and litigation.87  CERCLA has led to protracted disputes regarding the
division of liability among PRPs and between PRPs and insurers.88  While
nobody has produced a definitive study establishing the size of CERCLA
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89 See George Van Cleve, Would the Superfund Response Cost Allocation Procedures
Considered by the 103d Congress Reduce Transaction Costs, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10134, 10134 (1995); JAN PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, SUPERFUND AND
TRANSACTION COSTS:  THE EXPERIENCES OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL
FIRMS xi, xiii (1992) (five large industrial firms paid transaction costs of 21%; four national
insurance companies paid transaction costs of 88%); PROBST & PORTNEY, supra note 81,
at  x (admitting that magnitude of transaction costs is unknown, but offering speculation
that transaction costs range from $2 to $8 billion over 10 years); Robert W. McGee,
Superfund: It’s Time for Repeal After a Decade of Failure, 12 J. ENVT’L L. 118, 170 (1993)
(claiming that transaction costs “consume” much of the “Superfund budget”); John J.
Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability be Abolished, 6 STAN.
ENVT’L L. J. 271, 272 (1987); Abraham, supra note 80  (describing the causes of insurance
related transaction costs and predicting that they will decline over time).  Most estimates
of transaction costs in the literature are based on ACTON & DIXON, supra, published by the
Rand Corporation.  While the Rand Corporation study offers some hard data (which is in
very short supply), researchers should use caution in citing it.  It represents a small sample
of five large industrial firms and four national insurance companies.   See ACTON & DIXON,
supra at x, xii.  Cf.  Katherine N. Probst, Reforming Superfund: Who Will Pay, 8 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES, 63, 69 (1996-97) (very little is known about transaction costs at
sites with fewer PRPs) .  Acton and Dixon believe that their sample is representative of the
experience of other insurers and large industrial firms.  See ACTON & DIXON, supra at xiv.
But they consider the size of transaction costs for medium and small firms “an open
question.”  See ID. at xv.  Furthermore, this study is now more than a decade old.  See ID.
at 50 (transaction-cost share may drop as sites move through remediation).  Other studies
have been made, but some come from biased sources or reflect little data gathering.
See Lyons, supra at 313-16 (discussing estimates by interested parties and a government
projection of future transaction costs). 
90 See Robert P. Dahlquist, Making Sense of Superfund Allocation Decisions: The
Rough Justice of Negotiated and Litigated Allocations, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
11098, 11108 (2001) (claiming that the body of case that has developed governing
allocation of liability now enables counsel to “predict likely outcomes of allocation
disputes” and settle cases); GAO, SUPERFUND: TRENDS IN SPENDING FOR SITE CLEANUP
2 (1997) (percentage of government Superfund spending devoted to actual cleanup
increased from 54% in 1986 to 88% in 1996).
91 See Hedeman, supra note 86, at 10424-10425 (statutory amendments authorizing de
minimis settlements, mixed funding, and non-binding allocations of responsibility aimed
to reduce transaction costs); Lyons, supra note 88, at 313 (each Congressional committee
holding hearings on reauthorization heard testimony addressing the transaction cost
problem); Federal News Service, June 24, 1994, Statement of Carol Browner Before the
Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Committee on Government
Operations, U.S. House of Representatives (discussing several bills designed to reduce
transaction costs).
transaction costs, observers agree that these costs are very high.89  It is
possible, however, that transaction costs are declining.90
Congress has studied the transaction cost issue repeatedly and twice
amended the statute, in part to address transaction cost problems.91  And the
idea that government should reduce transaction costs continues to play an
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92 See, e.g., Van Cleve, supra note 88 (evaluating the capacity of legislative proposals
before the 103rd Congress to reduce transaction costs); Hedeman, supra note 86, at 10426
(calling for fundamental reform to reduce transaction costs); S. 8, 105th Cong. (1997)
(proposing a binding administrative procedure to allocate liability); Message to the
Congress on Environmental Policy, 31 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 558, 599 (April 6, 1995)
(President Clinton’s statement that “too many Superfund dollars have been spent on
lawyers”).
93 See James T.B. Tripp and Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing
Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. REG. 369, 377 (1989) (buying and
selling of use rights “must entail only minimal transaction costs”) [emphasis in original];
J.H. DALES, POLLUTION PROPERTY AND PRICES 92-100 (1968). 
94 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 289, 291-92, 311-19 (1998) (reviewing some of the history of emissions trading
programs).
95 See, e.g., id. at 291-92 (detailing policy makers support); Daniel J. Dudek & John
Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 217 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation:  A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 15-16 (1991); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case
for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
96 These programs include wetlands mitigation banking, see Royal C. Gardner,
Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV.
527, 532-533 (1996), transferrable development rights, see Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728-733 (1997) (describing the treatment of transferrable
development rights in a case leading to a takings claim), and effluent trading, see Ann
Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for Pollutant
Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 142-143 (1998).
enormous role in the Superfund debate.92  We believe it should play a
substantial role in the debate.  But we show in part II that the instinct to
reduce transaction costs, while healthy in this context, is not sufficient by
itself to ground meaningful reform recommendations.
(2) EMISSIONS TRADING
Recommendations to minimize transaction costs have also played
a significant role in the design of emissions trading programs,93 which have
become quite prevalent94 and enjoy the support of many academics and
policy makers95.  We use the term “emissions trading” to refer to a broad
variety of programs in which parties who have received authorization for
pollution or development of property trade these allowances.96  An example
will facilitate explanation of emissions trading.  Suppose that a regulator
wants 100 tons of pollution total reduction from two facilities.  Under a
uniform standards approach, the regulator would require each facility to
reduce emissions by 50 tons.  Often, however, facilities have unequal
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97 See Driesen, supra note 93, at 307.
98 See, e.g., Hahn & Stavins, supra note 94, at 6.
99 One might argue that we should think of this as a real transaction cost argument.
After all, we have substantial experience with traditional regulation and its associated
transaction costs.  See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 94, at 174 (discussing the
informational needs of best available technology standard setting).  Cf. Driesen, supra  note
93, at 327-332 (these same problems of complex information gathering can apply to
standard setting in conjunction with emissions trading).  In general, however,
environmental statutes do not direct agencies to tailor each control requirement to the
marginal cost of each facility to maximize cost effectiveness.  See  Howard Latin, Ideal
Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-
Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1302-03 (1985) (describing the
current regime as relying upon a technology-based approach not attuned to “particular costs
and benefits”).  So, the cost of doing this is a phantom transaction cost, a cost that would
arise if such a regime existed. 
100 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 132-33 (1977) a regime
requiring individual consideration of each permitted polluter’s individual circumstances
(continued...)
compliance cost.97  If one facility (which we will call Buyer) has a marginal
control cost of $10,000 a ton and another facility (which we will call Seller)
has a marginal control cost of $1,000 a ton, the total cost of this uniform
standards approach would be $550,000 (50 X $10,000 + 50 X $1,000).
Economists have criticized this uniform standard approach as inefficient.98
Emissions trading allows the regulator to get tailored cost effective
outcomes without actually acquiring marginal cost information from each
facility.  The regulator requires a 50 ton reduction from each facility as
above.  But she authorizes the owners of these facilities to trade emission
reductions.  Presumably, Buyer will pay Seller to reduce its emissions an
extra 50 tons and use the purchased credits in lieu of local compliance.
Seller eliminates 100 tons of emissions, using the first 50 tons to meet its
own 50 ton reduction obligation and selling the 50 tons of extra reductions
to Buyer.  Buyer will use these 50 tons of purchased reductions to comply
with its 50 ton reduction obligation, in lieu of actually reducing its own
emissions.  Seller happily earns a little more than $50,000 for its effort, and
Buyer happily avoids $500,000 in control costs.  The regulator achieves the
same 100 ton reduction at a fraction of the cost a uniform standard would
impose.  
The justification for emissions trading implicitly relies upon  public
transaction costs.99  The regulator could, in theory at least, assign efficient
non-uniform pollution reduction obligations to each facility.  But the time
and cost of collecting marginal control cost information for each facility
would prove prohibitive.100  Typically the regulated facility has information
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would impose an “impossible burden” upon EPA); Latin, supra note 98, at 1314-31
(explaining that  individualized, rather than uniform, standard setting has proven ineffective
because of the huge amount of information for fine tuning individual decisions).
101 See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 131-32 (1996) (discussing
regulators’ dependence on industry cost estimates).
102 See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control
Efficient?  Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative
Regimes, 1999 WISC. L. REV. 887, 889-92 (literature that considers public transaction costs
concludes that traditional regulation is not always less efficient than emissions trading).
See generally Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J.  ENVTL.
ECON. & MANAGEMENT 133, 144 n. 22 (1995) (noting that market transaction costs are
basically the counterpart of administrative costs in command and control regulation).
103 Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Comment: Goals, Instruments, and
Policy Choice, 10 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y FORUM 297, 309-10 (2000) (pointing out that
“implementation costs” of market based approaches might, at times, exceed implementation
costs of traditional regulation).
104 See, e.g., United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water,
Proposed Water Quality Trading Policy 6 (2002) (available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/proptradepolicy.pdf) (urging states and tribes
to use the internet to provide real time information on trades to lower transaction costs).
105  See Proposed Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg.
39668, 39670 (August 3, 1995)[hereinafter Open Market Trading Rule].  While EPA never
finalized this rule, a number of states adopted emissions trading proposals based on this
“open market” model.  See, e.g., Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans: Michigan Emissions Trading Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 9264, 9266, 9277 (February 7,
2001); Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plan: New Hampshire
Discrete Emission Reductions Trading Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 9278, 9279, 9283 (February
7, 2001); Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans: New Jersey Open
Market Emissions Trading Program, Revised Interpretation of Operating Permit
Requirements for Emissions Trades, 66 Fed. Reg. 1796, 1801 (January 9, 2001).  The open
(continued...)
about its control costs that the regulator might find it difficult to obtain (an
information asymmetry).101  Absent transaction costs, traditional regulation
aimed at cost effectiveness would produce cost effective outcomes.102
Because of public transaction costs, emissions trading often functions better
at producing these outcomes.103 
Arguments to reduce transaction costs have had their greatest
practical impact in influencing the design of emissions trading programs.
They figure heavily in EPA rulemaking and guidance establishing the
design of emissions trading programs.104  For example, in proposing an
open market trading rule, which spawned a number of state emission
trading programs, EPA noted that its previous trading rules had generated
a small volume of emissions, “perhaps due to high transaction costs.”105
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market trading rules generally follow a basic model proposed by Richard Ayres, a noted
pollution control expert.  See Richard Ayres, Developing a Market in Emission Credits
Incrementally: An ̀ Open Market’ Paradigm for Market-Based Pollution Control, 25 ENV’T
REP. (BNA) 1522 (1994).
106 See Open Market Trading Rule, supra note 104, at 39671.
107 OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, EPA, PUB. NO. 452/R-01-001, IMPROVING AIR
QUALITY WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 25 (2001) [hereinafter OAR GUIDANCE].
108 See, e.g., Perry S. Goldschein, Going Mobile:  Emissions Trading Gets a Boost
from Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credits, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 225, 236-
37 (1994/95) (suggesting that buyers cannot locate sellers easily without banking); Gary
E. Marchant, Global Warming:  Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions:  An Offset Policy for
Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL. L. 623, 668-69 (1992) (recommending banking to
address transaction cost problem).
109 See Stavins, supra note 101, at 145-46 (recommending government as broker and
auctions); David Sohn & Madeline Cohn, From Smokestacks to Species:  Extending the
Tradable Permit Approach from Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL.
L. J. 405, 442 (1996) (associating auction with reduced transaction costs).
110 See Stavins, supra note 101, at 145 (explaining that moving toward risk based
trading increases transaction costs); Marchant, supra note 107, at 644-48 (suggesting that
federal approval requirements for trades should cease); Sohn & Cohn, supra note 108, at
431-32 (approving the RECLAIM emissions trading program’s lack of public input in
deciding upon individual trades).
Much of EPA’s open market proposal sought to allow trades “before
governmental review and approval” in order to lower transaction costs.106
And, in recent guidance to states designing emissions trading programs,
EPA stated that successful trading programs have “control cost
differentials” that “exceed the transaction costs of making a trade.”107
Many writers addressing emissions trading have recommended that
regulators reduce transaction costs associated with emissions trading.  To
reduce the cost of locating sellers of credits, a number of writers
recommended establishing banks where owners of overcomplying facilities
could deposit credits for later purchase by owners of polluting facilities.108
Writers recommended that government reduce negotiation costs by serving
as a broker or auctioning off credits.109  In order to reduce delays and
expense arising out of government approvals, writers recommended
eliminating government approval requirements, opportunities for public
participation, and reliance upon relationships between reductions and
ambient air quality or risk.110  A later section of the paper will examine
some of these proposals.  The important point here, however, is that the
fundamental form of argument follows a pattern found in many other areas.
Scholars point out that the sale of emission reduction credits reduces
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111 See Tom H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, in
ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS 374-76 (2000).
112 See Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets:  Lessons
From Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J. L. &  ECON. 19, 33 (1995).
113 See generally id. at 33, 35, 39 (suggesting disapproval of transaction costs).
114  Coase provides an example of this counterfactual use of transaction costs analysis
in his summary of his theory of the firm in the 1960 article:
It is clear that an alternative form of economic organization which could achieve the
same result at less cost than would be incurred by using the market would enable the
value of production to be raised.  As I explained many years ago, the firm represents
such an alternative to organizing production through market transactions.  Within the
firm, individual bargains between the various co-operating factors of production are
eliminated and for a market transaction is substituted an administrative decision.
COASE, THE MARKET, supra note 6, at 115.   The costs associated with the “individual
bargains” that are “eliminated” through an “administrative decision” are an example of
what we call phantom transaction costs.  
compliance costs.111  Transaction costs impede realization of the maximum
number of sales.112  Therefore, government should reduce transaction costs
to facilitate trades and cost reduction.113  
Recommendations to reduce transaction cost dominate the debate
about Superfund and play a major role in the design of emissions trading
programs, both topics of major significance to environmental law.  The
minimization goal has profoundly influenced public law, contributing to a
movement toward privatization of government functions.    
   3.  PHANTOM TRANSACTION COSTS IN PRIVATE LAW
 Arguments for transaction cost minimization have a discernable
structure.  In private law, support for transaction cost minimization often
comes from theoretical claims that an existing legal rule or body of law
performs the function of reducing transaction costs.  We refer to this sort
of claim as a “phantom transaction cost claim.”  The argument takes the
form of hypothesizing a different legal arrangement than currently exists -
a phantom transaction.  This hypothetical arrangement would generate high
transaction costs.  Because nobody actually pays these transaction costs, we
refer to these as phantom transaction costs.  The writer then claims that the
actual legal rule avoids the transaction costs that would arise under the
hypothesized alternative regime.114  
Phantom transaction costs arguments abound in private law, but
sometimes can justify creation of public law.  So, for example, economists
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115 See POSNER, supra note 30, 71, at 61; A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 94 (1989).
116 Gordon, supra note 50, at 1628.
117 Id. at 1618-1619(describing different cases of market failures as tied to costs of
bargaining and negotating).
118 Id. at 1621. 
119 See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 258-264 (1991) (describing photocopying practices among academics and how
internalized norms trump federal copyright law and regulate excessive copying).
120 See Christopher K. Leman, “Direct Government” in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT:
A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 68 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (documenting and
countering the argument  that entrepreneurial government, one motivated by profit, would
do a better job of internalizing transaction costs).
applying Coase to environmental problems imagine breathers bribing a
polluter to reduce or eliminate emissions.115  This phantom transaction
would generate transaction costs.  Scholars have justified both actual rules
governing remedies in private suits and public environmental law as means
of avoiding these transaction costs associated with the bribery
phantom.[cite]
Similarly, some proponents of fair use imagine a teacher paying to
use a portion of an article in class - a phantom transaction.116  They imagine
that the transaction costs associated with this licensing, such phantom
transaction costs as finding the copyright owner and negotiating a license,
would be excessive.117  This vision helps justify the legal rule not requiring
a licensing payment in such cases.118  Fair use avoids payment of a phantom
transaction cost.119
By contrast, public law discussion of transaction costs these days
often involves claims that the existing rule, not the phantom, generates
excessive transaction costs.  This claim can motivate reform
recommendations - such as recommendations to privatize public law.120  
Both types of analysis - analysis of direct transaction costs from
public law and phantom transaction costs of private law - tend to support
private markets and private law, while disfavoring established public law.
Thus, transaction cost minimization plays an important role in support “free
market” solutions to problems.
 
In spite of the pervasiveness of the transaction cost minimization
goal, scholars do not share an agreed definition of transaction costs.  We
discuss this problem below and propose a working definition useful to
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121 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1213 (suggesting that lawyers were concerned
with comparative institutional analysis even in the 1930s); HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(1994); Karl Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions upon Economics, 15 AMER. ECON.
REV. 665, 678-679 (1925) (illustrating the recognition of legal institutions for economics
in the works of a major legal realist thinker).
122 See, e.g., JEFFREY L. HARRISON, THOMAS D. MORGAN & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 353-493 (1997) (materials on
the legal and economic issues related to rate setting).
123 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in COASE, THE MARKET,  supra note
6, at 38-39.
124 Id. at 45-47 (identifying costs of organization, factors of production, and decision
making as determining the size of a firm).
125 Id. at 6, 38.
considering the broad range of policy problems that transaction cost
minimization influences- i.e. useful for consideration of both public and
private law problems.  
     B.  Defining Transaction Costs
The concept of transaction costs has arisen in economic literature
comparing institutional arrangements.  Legal analysis frequently involves
institutional choice, choices about which institution should have the right
to make decisions, and therefore also grapples with transaction costs.121 The
choice about whether to allow private markets or government regulators to
set utility rates provides an example of the institutional choices frequently
subject to legal analysis.122  Definitions of transaction costs have tended to
vary with the institutional choice issue under consideration
The use of transaction costs as an analytical tool has its roots in the
work of Ronald Coase, an early student of institutional choice.  In his 1937
article, The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase used transaction costs to
examine firms’ choices between purchasing goods and services through
contract and integration of the firm - i.e. acquiring other firms or hiring
additional employees to extend the firm’s output of goods and services.123
Coase concluded that when the costs of contracting for goods and services
are too high, firms would choose to integrate and regulate activity through
the hierarchy of corporate structure.124  He referred to these contracting
costs as transaction costs, defining them the “costs of using the price
system.”125  He did not elaborate what these costs were in detail but he
suggests that they include the costs of drafting a contract, monitoring
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126 See id. at 38-39 (discussing cost of arriving at a contract as only one aspect of
transaction costs associated with using the “price mechanism”).
127 See id. at 44 (analyzing costs of hypothetical transaction between Firm A and Firm
B, including a hypothetical purchase of B by A).
128 Gilson explicitly identifies the cost of acquiring information about prospective
employees as a transaction cost.  See Gilson, supra note 1, at 272.  Coase emphasizes the
role of uncertainty in explaining the need for the entrepreneur and for the firm, rather than
the market system, to coordinate economic activity.   COASE, THE MARKET, supra note 6,
at 47-51 (discussing economist Frank Knight’s idea that the entrepreneur serves to deal
with uncertainty and other information problems in production).
129 Coase discusses monitoring and other agency costs in the firm directly and by
reference to the law of master and servant.  See COASE, THE MARKET, supra note 6, at 53-
55.
130 See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND
MANAGEMENT 254, 256 (1992).
131 Id. at 329-332 (describing employment relationship and the role of contract).
132 See COASE, THE MARKET, supra note 6, at 53-55 (discussing relationship between
employment relationship and firm). MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 129, at 128-
129(costs of enforcing contracts).
133 See COASE, THE MARKET, supra note 6, at 44 (comparing costs of integration to
purchase of products and services on open market).
134 See ID. at 114.
performance, and ensuring fulfillment of contractual obligations.126  Yet, at
times, Coase seems to suggest that the costs of integrating a firm constitute
transaction costs of a sort as well.127  When firms acquire other firms or hire
employees to perform new functions, firms pay transaction costs to obtain
information about the human assets they acquire,128 and incur additional
costs monitoring the performance of their employees thereafter.129  While
some analysts refer to these latter costs as agency costs,130 they are
amenable to classification as transaction costs.  After all, an employment
relationship generates a contract.131  And this contract, like a contract for
goods and services from an outside firm, has costs associated with its
creation, including monitoring and enforcement.  One can view
employment as a transaction, and the costs associated with it as transaction
costs.132  Certainly, a goal of minimizing transaction costs cannot guide a
question of institutional choice - like the choice between integration of a
firm and contacting with outside firms - unless the term encompasses the
significant costs of both options.133
Coase expanded his definition when he wrote The Problem of Social
Cost, to make it useful in addressing the possibility of negotiating around
property rules established in nuisance suits.134   In this context, Coase
interpreted  transaction costs to mean the costs of negotiating very broadly,
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135 See ID.  Professor Carol Rose offers a useful typology of transaction costs, dividing
them into Type I and Type II costs.  The first type arise prior to bargaining and encompass
the costs of finding the bargaining partner and beginning negotiations.  The second are the
costs that arise in the process of bargaining.  See Rose, supra note 30, at 2185.  The
Problem of Social Costs expanded the definition to include Type II costs.
136 See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to
the Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY
ANALYSIS 60 (Robert Haveman & Julius Margolis, eds., 1970).
137 See Douglas W. Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 Research in Law &
Economics 1, 18 (1991).
138 See id. at 11-12. See  also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERIES OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 26-29 (2000).
139 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 68-69 (1990) (internal cites omitted).
including the costs of finding a bargaining partner.135  And Coase applies
this definition to a very unconventional contract - a bribe.  The transaction
here involves paying somebody to refrain from a disruptive activity - often
pollution. 
Subsequently, economists began to move toward defining
transaction costs in ways that included government.  Professor Kenneth
Arrow equates transaction costs with “costs that impede or block the
formation or markets” or “costs of running an economic system.”136  This
latter definition would seem to include at least the costs that governments
incur in enforcing contracts or establishing property rights.  The economist
Douglas Allen explicitly defines transaction costs as “resources used to
establish and maintain property rights.”137 Taken literally, this definition
would include administrative costs associated with government. Surely,
government enforcement of trespass laws and recording of deeds, for
example, involve using “resources” to “establish” (through deed recording)
and “maintain” (through trespass enforcement) property rights.138  
Douglas North, a leading institutional economist, also implicitly
includes government costs within the ambit of transaction costs.  In his
work exploring  the differences between communist and capitalist systems
he treats a set of costs associated with communist government as
transaction costs in order to facilitate a comparative analysis.  He contrasts
“costs that go through the market” with “hard-to-measure costs that include
time acquiring information, queuing, bribery, and so forth, as well as the
losses due to imperfect monitoring and enforcement.”139  These hard-to-
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140 The economics literature, particularly the transaction costs economics literature, has
a very thin and weak theory of the state.  Douglass North acknowledges this when he
characterizes public choice theorists as reducing the state to a leviathan, “something like
the Mafia.”  Id. at 140.  He concludes, however, that “the traditional public choice literature
is clearly not the whole story.” Id.   Sophisticated theories of the state have been developed
recently by Yoram Barzel and Mancur Olson.  See YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE
STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE 185-197 (2002)
(elaborating on the state’s role in enhancing market exchange); MANCUR OLSON, POWER
AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 66 (2000)
(“When the idea of transaction costs is used in conjunction with an appreciation of the
salience of coercive power, it can provide useful insights into politics and government.”).
141 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC LAW 40 (1987)
(describing separation of powers as raising the “transaction costs of government”);
KOMESAR IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra  note 12, at 141-142 (comparing the relative
costs of the political process and adjudication).  Cooter and Ulen do consider costs of
administering the courts or an agency as a type of transaction cost but one different from
the transaction costs of private bargaining.  In their view, administrative costs are more like
taxes that must be paid when legal or administrative services are obtained. See COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 31, at 320-321.  So described transaction costs in the public law context
will most likely fall into Type II transaction costs, as defined by Carol Rose, costs that arise
in the process of bargaining.  See Rose, supra note 30, at 2185.
142 Indeed, even a narrow definition of transaction costs as costs associated with the
free market might count some costs of government coercion as transaction costs, for even
this narrow definitions may include the costs of enforcing contracts.   See COASE, THE
MARKET, supra note 6, at 38-39 (“The costs of negotiating and concluding a separate
contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken
into account.”).  These costs purchase attempts to secure judicial orders to pay damages or
perform contractual obligations.  Even contract consists of a mix of a voluntary agreement
and government coercion after a party finds compliance undesirable and seeks to break the
agreement.  
Once one concedes that employment contracts and their enforcement generate
transaction costs, (which seems implicit even in The Nature of the Firm) then many
government administrative costs may be characterized as transaction costs.  For
government pays people to educate children, pick up garbage, run prisons and perform
other functions.  Its administrative costs incurred in selecting the people to hire (via
(continued...)
measure costs include costs incurred in non-voluntary economic
arrangements involving government.140    
Academic lawyers have tended to apply a broad concept of
transaction costs, that encompasses the costs of private contracting and
some of the costs of creating and implementing government solutions to
problems.  Richard Posner, Neil Komesar, and others who have written
about transaction cost minimization often treat the cost of government
decision-making as a transaction cost.141  This treatment appears consistent
with some, but not all, of the economists’ definitions.142  
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contract) to perform these functions and monitoring their performance surely count as
transaction cost.  It would be nonsensical to consider comparable costs associated with
private parties hiring people to perform these functions (as they often do nowadays) to be
transaction costs, but not call them transaction costs when government pays for the same
things directly.  And privatization adds a layer of transaction costs, since government must
contract with private firms to perform formerly public services.   See SCLAR, supra note ?,
at 13 (government contracting for services, like private contracting for services, “involves
elaborate . . . relationships between” government purchasers and private vendors). 
143 See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 12, at 3-4 (discussing
comparative institutional analysis).
144 See id. at 22 (discussing the need for analysis of the relative merits of two
institutions when compared with each other).
145 ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION  53 (2001)  (“By reducing the
transaction costs of bargaining, the constitution increases the probability that political
factions will cooperate with each other.”) 
146 AVINASH DIXIT, THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION-COST POLITICS
PERSPECTIVE ? (1996).
147 See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Markets are Not Magic, 20 ENVT’L FORUM 19
(November/December 2003) (explaining how cost-benefit approaches to environmental law
treat government standard setting as an ordinary transaction to purchase a good).
 Professor Neal Komesar argues that Coase’s seminal work on
transaction costs is part of a program of comparative institutional
analysis.143  Komesar argues, correctly, in our view, that good institutional
analysis must compare the costs of the institutional alternatives, such as the
choice between a government solution and a market solution to a
problem.144  Thus, institutional choice requires comparison of the “friction
cost” associated with a free market resolution to the friction cost in making
government decisions.  It makes sense to view both sets of costs as
transaction costs.  
In addition to Komesar, two prominent scholars in the law and
economics arena, Robert Cooter and Avinash Dixit,  have broached the
issue of a transaction cost analysis of public law, both implicitly employing
a very broad definition of transaction costs.  Professor Cooter refers to the
costs of bargaining among political factions as transaction costs in The
Strategic Constitution.145 And Professor Dixit refers to the costs incurred
in making and enforcing bargains about policy between voters and
politicians as transaction costs.146  Not surprisingly, as legal analysts
expand the concept of a “transaction” into a metaphor for politics and
government decisions of many kinds,147 the definition of transaction costs
expands.  Scholars who define transaction costs to include costs associated
with government decision-making either implicitly or explicitly widen the
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transaction costs (defined as the cost of protecting property rights) supports this point.   But
he argues that information costs are not sufficient for the existence of transaction costs. 
See Allen, supra note 136, at 6 (“The immediate implication [of the fact that information
is costly] is that information costs are a necessary condition for a transaction cost problem.
Information costs are not always transaction costs.”). As support for the proposition that
information costs are not sufficient, Professor Allen points to the costs of searching for the
lowest price or the costs of acquiring knowledge about the attributes of certain goods or
potential trading partners.  These costs are information costs, but not transaction costs,
because they arise independent of any specific transactions in which the person seeking the
information is involved. Id. at 7.  Information costs, says Allen, are only transaction costs
when information becomes difficult to verify.    As Professor Allen explains:
When a good contains attributes that are either alterable or variable, but does not
contain both, then transaction costs are zero or negligible.  Both alterability and
variability are needed in order for transaction costs to arise, because these costs stem
from the inability to attribute changes in product quality directly to random events or
non-random exploitation. 
(continued...)
definition of a transaction so that it includes the making of a government
decision.  
A broad definition of transaction costs (and of transactions)  helps
make the best case for the transaction cost minimization goal.  If
transaction cost minimization means that we should lower the costs of
private transactions even when doing so raises government administrative
costs by a far greater amount, then the transaction cost minimization goal
serves as an ideological construct motivating privatization, rather than as
an analytical tool.  If, on the other hand, the transaction cost minimization
goal means to lower the overall friction costs associated with solving
problems, then the goal appears more like an analytical tool.  To perform
adequately as a tool for legal analysis, transaction cost analysis must
include administrative costs.  
Because a broad definition aids legal analysis, we define transaction
costs to include both administrative costs associated with government
actions and private costs associated with market transactions.  We also
define transaction costs to include the costs of acquiring information
needed for a private transaction or public decision.
Thus, for example, the money a prospective purchaser spends to
have a mechanic examine a used car, constitutes a transaction cost.  Gilson
and other writers commonly treat costs of information acquisition as
transaction costs. [cite]  And many costs commonly included in transaction
cost definitions involve information acquisition.148  
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 Id. at 8.  To illustrate this point, Professor Allen recognizes that the quality of a
commodity may be both alterable by man and variable in nature.  Id. at 10.  Information
costs become transaction costs when it is not possible for a transacting party to determine
whether the quality of a commodity results from variation in nature or from alteration by
the other party.  Id.  For example, if the transaction is over a commodity like wheat, the
purchasing party may not be able to tell whether the poor quality of the wheat is due to
nature or due to the actions of the farmer who is selling the wheat.  If the purchaser cannot
distinguish between cheating by the other side and random acts of nature, then transaction
costs arise and need to be addressed through market intervention.  Professor Allen points
out  that the problem of verifiability of information is the key to the existence of transaction
costs. Id. at 8-9.   For a discussion of the verifiability issue, see DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL.,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 89-90 (1994).
 Costs incurred in developing information about the price and quality of goods and
services, however, should count as transaction costs.  Parties search for information about
the price or quality of a commodity because they contemplate entering into a transaction.
We cannot see why else the information would be of value. Furthermore, the time buyers
spend discovering readily available information about price and quality does constitute a
transaction cost.  Transaction cost surely rises when verifying information becomes
difficult. Allen would characterize these costs as “information costs.”  As he states, “The
acts of finding a partner, determining the correct good for a particular need, or searching
for the ‘best price’ are information costs, not transaction costs.”  Id. at 7.  We are not sure
that this distinction makes sense.  If transaction costs arise when information is both
variable and alterable, the characteristics of trading partner, one’s needs, the
appropriateness of a good, and price can each be altered and can be affected by random
events.    Allen’s distinctions make sense only if he is focusing on what Carol Rose calls
Type II transaction costs, those that arise in the bargaining process.  However, Type I
transaction costs also exist. See Rose,  supra note 30, at 2184.
Our definition of transaction costs as including “public transaction
costs” implies that public acquisition and processing of information for
public decisions produces transaction costs.  Just as private parties acquire
information as they negotiate a contract, public authorities acquire
information as they decide how to exercise their decision-making authority.
In both cases, people pay to acquire information needed for decisions.
For purposes of this paper, we define transaction costs as "the costs
of dealing with people." These costs include costs associated with both
private contracting and government decision-making - including the cost
of acquiring information for both sorts of transactions. We offer this
definition to indicate the breadth of costs the transaction cost minimization
rationale has been applied to in legal theory and practice and as a general
aid to the reader. The argument that transaction costs have functions that
call into question their reflexive minimization does not rely upon this (or
any other) definition of transaction costs. And this definition does not
purport to reconcile the many conflicting definitions scholars have offered.
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The Economic Organisation of a P.O.W. Camp, 12(48) ECONOMICA 189, 190 (1945)
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model); Paul A. Samuelson, The Gains from International Trade, 5(2) THE CANADIAN
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 195, 203-204 (1939)(analytics of one
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Crusoe assumption); Milton Friedman, Choice, Chance and the Personal Distribution of
Income, 61(4) J. POL. ECON. 277, 279-281 (1953) (analyzing questions of allocation in a
Robinson Crusoe world which is used as a benchmark for analysis of an economy with
many persons); Richard Stone, The Theory of Games, 58(230) THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL
185, 185 (1948) (Robinson Crusoe assumption as background to the theory of games);
George J. Stigler, The Successes and Failures of Professor Smith, 84 (6) J. POL. ECON.
1199, 1211-1212 (1976) (failure of Robinson Crusoe assumption to take account of
benefits of division of labor); Paul Streeten, Economics and Value Judgments, 64(4)
QUART. J. ECON. 583, 587 (1950) (likening  atomistic competitive system as Robinson
Crusoe world); Jack Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and
Information: An Expository Survey, 17(4) J. ECON. LIT. 1375, 1378 (1979) (by contrast to
Robinson Crusoe world, “in the world of affairs studied by economists there are
interpersonal arrangements-insurance contracts, futures markets, guarantees and collateral,
the corporation and other forms of combined exchange”); Paul A. Samuelson, Social
Indifference Curves, 70(1) QUART. J. ECON. 1, 3 (1956)(brief mention of Robinson Crusoe
assumption and welfare economics); N. Georgescu-Roegen, Economic Theory and
Agrarian Economics, 12(1) OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 4 (1960) (Robinson Crusoe
assumption and Marxist thinking of agricultural and industrial economies). But see Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57(2) THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
347, 347-348 (1967) (property rights are meaningless concept in Robinson Crusoe world);
Melanie Samson, Towards a ‘Friday’ Model of International Trade: A Feminist
Deconstruction of Race and Gender Bias in the Robinson Crusoe Trade Allegory, 28(1)
THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 143, 144-149 (1995)(challenging biases latent in
Robinson Crusoe assumption); Julie A. Nelson., Feminism and Economics, 9(2) THE
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 131, 135 (1995) (commenting on Robinson Crusoe
assumption in economic theory).
 
While this definition may appear inordinately broad, it is plausible,
useful, and gets at the heart of a common element in all the disparate
definitions scholars have employed to describe transaction costs. To see the
definition’s plausibility and usefulness, consider the example of Robin
Crusoe alone on an island trying to figure out how to best use the available
resources, an example frequently used in economic textbooks to illustrate
the basic economic problem of allocating scarce resources.149  Robinson
Crusoe would incur production costs from picking fruit or fishing (for
example), but not transaction costs, since there is nobody there to transact
with.   
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Only when we add people to the desert island does the possibility
of transaction costs arise, because this addition creates the possibility of
trade, i.e. of transactions.  Suppose that Friday can build a shelter more
efficiently than Robinson Crusoe.  It might be worthwhile for them to agree
that Friday should build the shelter that both will share, while Robinson
Crusoe supplies the food.  This may improve the welfare of both through
trade.  But to make this arrangement they will have to spend time
bargaining about it.  We refer to this additional costs (and other costs
incurred in their interaction with respect to this transaction) as transaction
costs.  Unlike the standard economic textbook model of trade, we recognize
that trading itself introduces costs into the economy and these costs must
be taken into consideration in designing markets and other institutions.  The
insight that markets and other institutions are not costless is the key
contribution of the transaction cost approach.  We capture this insight with
our definition.
The “dealing with other people” definition’s reach becomes more
apparent if by some magic, Robinson Crusoe and Friday multiply and we
have the formation of organizations like the family, the firm, and the state.
Now the transaction costs, including public transaction costs, multiply, but
production costs are still identifiable.  They are the costs that Robinson
Crusoe would have expended had he lived by himself.  So if the state builds
housing, the cost of the  resources that Robinson Crusoe would have
expended to build similar housing by himself on the island would be
production costs; the costs that would arise from having to deal with the
range of people, both private and public, would be the transaction costs.
The comprehensiveness of our working definition enables the definition to
work in the many areas where the transaction cost minimization rationale
has influenced legal practice. 
II.  THE BENEFITS OF  TRANSACTION COSTS
When people pay transaction costs they frequently purchase
something of value.  In particular, transaction costs often purchase
information that facilitates efficient transactions, avoids inefficient
transactions, or allows for equitable decisions.  What are often identified
as undesirable transaction costs actually provide transaction benefits which
are often realized through intermediaries, such as lawyers and brokers, who
facilitate transactions.      
Below we use information theory to better explain  transaction
costs’ role in free markets.  We then build on this foundation to explain
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150 Professor Komesar explains: 
Although the modern successors of Coase have focused on the costs of
information, and in particular, on the implication of differences in endowed
information positions of the transacting parties, these problems with information
are not traced to low stakes or variations in stakes, or for that matter, to any well-
defined source. The analysis simply recognizes that some people are exposed to
and possess more information than others.
 KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 12, at 107 n. 14.
151 See id.
152 Id.
153 For an excellent discussion of the issues raised by markets and information, see
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMAN, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 1-25 (1996).
three functions transaction costs perform.  They aid avoidance of bad
transactions, facilitate efficient transactions, and supply dignity and equity
in some settings.   
A.  Transaction Costs, Information, and Markets
Both economists and academic lawyers recognize that transaction
costs often pay for the acquisition and management of information.  But
they have not developed the implications of this insight for transaction cost
functions.150 
Economists recognize that some people have more information than
others.151  When one party to a transaction has more information than
another, an information “asymmetry” arises.  But economists have not
explained the source of these asymmetries.152 
Recognition of the role of markets for information can help explain
this puzzle.  The acquisition of information can be viewed as the
acquisition of a commodity, like other products or services.  Many market
transactions,  from purchases of financial services to contracts for legal
services, involve purchases of information. The recognition of information
as a commodity raises many issues for transaction cost analysis.153  
Indeed, recent Nobel Prize winning work examining markets in
information posits that information asymmetries play a key role in creating
markets.  Grossman and Stiglitz point out that if everyone had common
beliefs and expectations in financial markets, then markets for securities
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would not exist because there would be no basis for trade.154  Market trades
exist because some individuals believe that an asset being traded is
overvalued by the market and others believe it is undervalued.155  If no
information asymmetry exited, then no basis for trading the assets assessed
in purchased information would exist.  Yet, neoclassical economists
commonly claim that perfect information is a prerequisite for a competitive
market.156  The observation that perfect information markets are impossible
is known as the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox.157   The paradox arises from the
idea that a key characteristic of a perfect market - the possession of perfect
information by all parties - would extinguish markets.
  
Markets in information may help explain the paradox.  Asymmetries
in belief about the value of assets may reflect differences in expenditures
to acquire information.  But, to quote Grossman and Stiglitz, “because
differences in beliefs themselves are endogenous, arising out of the
expenditures on information and the informativeness of the price system,
the creation of markets eliminates the differences of beliefs which give rise
to them, and thus causes those markets to disappear.”158  Grossman and
Stiglitz’s argument is directed at the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the
proposition that in an efficient market, the market price must reflect all
available information about the assets being traded.159  Contradicting the
Efficient Market Hypothesis, Grossman and Stiglitz demonstrate that
“because information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the
information which is available, since if it did those who spent resources to
obtain it would receive no compensation.”160   In other words, if prices
accurately and completely reflected all market information, then markets
themselves would not exist.
Nobody has spelled out the implications of markets in information
for transaction cost functions.  But the idea that purchases of information
make markets in the assets about which information is being sought
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possible helps explain why information is valuable.  And that explanation
provides the basis for understanding the functions that transaction costs
purchasing information serve. 
Economists only assume that transactions are efficient under
conditions of perfect information, a condition that real markets rarely
meet.161  Transactions based on very good information are likely to be
efficient, but transactions based on very poor information are much less
likely to be efficient.  This would seem intuitively obvious.  If an investor
buys stock knowing nothing about a company, she is more likely to pay too
much than an investor who knows more about it.  While, in the world of
perfect information transactions are inherently good, in the real world,
people can buy things that have less value than they anticipated and paid
for.162  
Since parties to transactions want to make good deals they tend to
incur transaction costs to acquire information about the object of the
transaction.  Parties to contracts make decisions -  decisions to purchase
goods, to lend money, to buy shares, to employ workers, and to acquire
companies.  Governments also make decisions predicated upon
information. And they too incur transaction costs in obtaining and
processing that information.  The key to understanding transaction cost
functions involves analysis of why precisely government and private parties
spend money to acquire information. 
B. Transaction Costs As an Aid in Avoiding Bad Transactions
Recognition of the key role of information leads to identification of
an important function of transaction costs - the purchase of information
needed to avoid bad transactions.  We refer to this function as the
avoidance function.  Disclosure requirements and due diligence, for
example, add to the costs of a transaction, but each helps the buyer avoid
bad transactions.  In a transaction costless world, transactions would occur
instantaneously at no cost to the parties involved.  But such unorchestrated,
spontaneous transactions would result in regret, bad deals, and the
possibility of misfeasance or malfeasance by the parties involved.
Transaction costs slow down the process of transacting and provide a
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means for parties and the market system to sort out the good transactions
from the bad.  We illustrate this point with examples from private law and
public law.
1.  PRIVATE LAW   
A real estate transaction offers perhaps the best example of
transaction cost incurred to avoid bad deals.163  Lenders commonly pay for
credit checks of purchasers.164  This delays closing, but provides the
information needed to know whether the buyer will likely repay the loan.165
Lenders also require title searches.166  This likewise takes time, but assures
that the homeowner has a clear claim to the real estate purchased, thereby
making the collateral secure.167  Buyers also commonly make their offers
contingent upon inspection.168  They then must undergo delay and expense
to carry out this procedure.  But the inspection provides sufficient
information about the property to make it likely that its purchase will
satisfy the buyer.169  In short, a real estate transaction has a structure
designed to transfer information among the parties and provide protection
against bad transactions. 
Business transactions often involve fairly high transaction costs in
order to avoid bad deals.  Gilson argues that lawyers in corporate
acquisitions reduce transaction costs.170  Yet, he starts from a premise that
the client already has decided to devote significant resources to developing
information about the target company.171  In other words, the client has
already made the decision to pay significant transaction costs, and the
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lawyer then seeks to engineer the transaction so that the information
performing the avoidance functions comes in as cheaply as possible.172  
A good lawyer, however, might encourage a client less
sophisticated than Gilson’s to get more information than the client initially
seemed interested in.  If the client seemed inclined to proceed with an
inadequate information base, the lawyer might recommend obtaining
certain information needed to avoid problems he has seen in his corporate
acquisition practice.  This recommendation, if adopted, would raise
transaction costs.
Surely, lawyers sometimes add cost to a transaction.  Lawyers,
however, have experience which enables them to spot potential future
problems that a client might overlook.  When they do this, they may raise
transaction costs, but reduce the chances that the transaction will turn out
to be a bad deal.    Lawyers can be thought of as creators and providers of
information.  They serve an important function in the market for
information.
The literature on game theory implicitly recognizes that transaction
costs can aid avoidance of inefficiency.  For example, Professors Baird,
Gertner, and Picker’s book on game theory and law points out that the
possibility of renegotiating a contract undermines the incentives to perform
on a contract.173  In other words, if each party to a contract knows that the
other party may not sue on the contract but may be persuaded to renegotiate
the terms of the contract, then each party loses some incentive to fully
perform.  If the parties could reduce or eliminate the possibility of
renegotiation, the incentives to perform the original contract would be
restored.   Transaction costs that make it more difficult to renegotiate the
contract would reduce the possibility of renegotiation and hence would be
desirable from an efficiency perspective.174  Gertner and Picker point out
that the parties can impose these transaction costs by introducing a term in
their contract providing that, “If either of us seeks to renegotiate, we will
pay a third party a large sum of money.”175  The problem with such a term
is that the agreement with the third party could also be renegotiated if
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transaction costs are low enough.176  One solution to this problem, the
authors suggest, is to enter into these side deals with a number of third
parties.177  The authors conclude, “The high transaction costs in reaching
an agreement with the diverse parties may provide the deterrent that
ensures that renegotiations do not take place.”178  This example from game
theory illustrates the theoretical benefits of transaction costs in preserving
the efficiency of contract. 
2.  PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The suggestion that business lawyers may create value when they
raise transaction costs may seem counterintuitive.   But the notion that we
need more transaction costs at times enjoys a well-established place in our
jurisprudence.  In adjudicating procedural due process cases, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that at times we need to add more
transaction costs - more process - in order to reduce the risk of error.
The United States Constitution forbids government deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without “due process” of law.179  The Supreme
Court has developed a jurisprudence seeking to answer the question of what
process is due before such a rights deprivation can occur.180  This
procedural due process jurisprudence employs a balancing test to answer
that question.181  The balancing test requires judges to assess the weight of
the rights deprivation, the potential cost of additional process, and the
potential value of additional procedures in deciding whether additional
process is due.182  
The Supreme Court frequently finds that some additional procedure
is needed in procedural due process cases.183  Often, the Court requires a
hearing prior to deprivation of a property or liberty interest, even when the
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(continued...)
government has not required one in the past.184  A hearing, of course, is a
process decision-makers may use to acquire information prior to acting.  It
differs little from information gathering procedures that buyers might
employ before engaging in private transactions.  Purchasers of used cars
usually hold an informal hearing before purchasing the car.  They ask
sellers questions about the condition of the car and consider written
documents (such as service records and classified advertising) that the
sellers have provided to motivate a favorable decision.  If a buyer takes a
car to a mechanic for inspection prior to purchase, the buyer has done
something analogous to listening to an expert witness in a hearing (which
a judge might do before making a decision).    
Under the Court’s balancing test, a decision to add a hearing
requirement (or any other additional process) involves a decision to raise
the cost of potential procedure.185  In other words, the Court raises
transaction costs.  
It does this for reasons that should sound familiar to readers of
Gilson’s pioneering work on transaction costs.  If the government does not
acquire adequate information, it may make an erroneous decision, just as
a potential purchaser of a corporation can make an erroneous decision
absent generation of adequate information about the value of a potential
corporate acquisition.  Indeed, the Court evaluates the “risk of error” in
deciding whether to add additional transaction costs.186  If the consequences
of error are sufficiently serious, more transaction cost may be appropriate
in order to make sure that a good transaction results.  The jurisprudence
recognizes that absent sufficient information gathering, the decision may
prove harmful and erroneous.187
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193 Cf. id. at 869-873 (explaining that the question of the appropriate level of attorneys
fees depends on underlying normative judgments).
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In the context of due process, the Court has addressed the value of
paying an attorney, the transaction cost used to introduce this article.188  It
has recognized that counsel can help bring legal and factual information
before the Court, which can improve the accuracy of the proceedings.189  
Martha McCluskey, in criticizing recent legislative decisions that
reduce transaction costs in worker’s compensation schemes through
modification of the rules governing attorney fees, points out that attorney
fees pay for information about rights to benefits.190 Limiting access to
attorneys in order to reduce transaction costs, she points out, may limit
access to benefits.191  She provides examples of cases in which workers
with apparently meritorious (and quite serious) claims failed to win a
compensation award, because they lacked the help needed to present a
complex case adequately.192  In other words, a bad transaction, an incorrect
adjudication of a worker’s compensation claim, occurred.  McCluskey
suggests that adequate attorney fees would make good transactions, i.e.
accurate adjudication of claims, more likely.193      
This avoidance function exists regardless of who pays the
transaction costs.  In many of the procedural due process cases, the Court
has focused upon government burdens from additional process - i.e. public
transaction costs.194  But as the attorney fee examples suggest, private
transaction costs, such as the fees a private party pays an attorney, can
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attachment of real estate in an assault case).  
200 See also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEG. STUDIES 399, 430 (1973) (reduction in litigation expenses
can, at some point, increase error).  
201 See, e.g., Hahn & Hester, supra note ?, at 149 (recommending reducing certain
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purchase information needed to avoid bad transactions as well.  In Mullane
v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., Inc.,195 the Court added private transaction
costs on procedural due process grounds.  In that case, the Court
adjudicated the constitutionality of a statutory requirement that the trustee
of a “common trust fund” provide notice of a judicial settlement of
accounts through publication in a local newspaper.196 The Court found that
newspaper publication provided trust beneficiaries with constitutionally
insufficient notice.197  It required the Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Company (and similarly situated private  trustees) to provide more costly
and elaborate notice (at least in most situations) to safeguard trust
beneficiary’s right to contest the settlement of accounts.198   Even some of
the cases mandating increases of public transaction costs on due process
grounds, increase private transaction costs indirectly.  Cases forbidding
state use of ex parte procedures presumably increase creditors’ enforcement
costs, in the name of procedural due process.199   Thus, the Court has
recognized the desirability, at times, of increasing private as well as public
transaction costs in order to generate sufficient information for a good
decision.200        
3.  EMISSIONS TRADING
Commentators have often urged the reduction of transaction costs
in the emissions trading context, but they often say little about their positive
functions.201  A number of significant  transaction costs arise because of the
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types of federal oversights of emission trades in order to reduce transaction costs and
encourage cost savings); Goldschein, supra note 107, at 260 (suggesting approval of
interstate or regional trades to reduce transaction costs); Sohn & Cohn, supra note 108, at
419-20, 431-32 (writing approvingly of efforts to reduce transaction costs in emissions
trading); Marchant, supra note 107, at 644-45 (recommending eliminating federal approval
of trades in order to reduce transaction costs); Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for
Climate Change:  How can National Governments Address a Global Problem, 1997 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 293, 317 (one aim of trading regimes should be to keep transaction costs low);
Foster & Hahn, supra note 111, at 33, 35, 39 (suggesting disapproval of transaction costs);
Stavins, supra note 101, at 145 (government can avoid creating regulatory barriers, such
as preapproval requirements, that drive up the cost of trades).
202 See Hahn & Hester, supra note ?, at 144 (transaction costs exist because of need to
satisfy environmentalists that trades will not adversely affect environmental quality).
203 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 94, at 184 (suggesting estimating current
aggregate pollution reduction requirements as the first step in creating a tradeable permit
program).
204 See, e.g.,  Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Michigan
Emissions Trading Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 9264, 9267 (February 7, 2001) (provisions in
state trading program that might lessen environmental quality deemed unacceptable).
205  See Driesen, supra note 93, at 338 (emissions trading authorizes “trading around”
of government-created obligations).
206 See Proposed Approval of Michigan Emissions Trading Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at
9275 (emissions trading modifies an existing set of restrictions to authorize alternative
restrictions that EPA views as collectively more stringent).
need to prevent bad transactions.  They provide the information needed to
distinguish between good and bad transactions.202
By a good transaction, we mean one that provides the public with
at least as valuable reduction in environmental harms as it would obtain
without the transaction.  Most trading proponents justify trading by
claiming that it produces the same environmental harm reduction as would
arise through non-tradeable permits at less cost.203  So, this definition flows
from the underlying theory of trading.  It also, in practice, governs many
government decisions about the design of emissions trading programs.204
Since trades rearrange government-imposed obligations to make
environmental improvements,205 one can in principle determine the value
of the harm reduction the government has planned for.  The rearrangement
of obligations that parties bring about through trades should produce an
equivalent or better environmental result.206  
The need to avoid bad transactions motivates governments to
examine emissions trades with public input before approving them in some
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207 See Proposed Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg.
39668, 39671 (August 3, 1995).  
208 See id.; Approval of Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Illinois Emissions
Trading Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 52343, 52350 (October 15, 2001) (recognizing that
measurement difficulties create significant uncertainties in trading volatile organic
compound emission reductions), codified at 40 C.F.R. part 52 (2002).
209 See Lisa A. Wainger, Dennis King, James Salzman, and James Boyd, Wetland
Value Indicators for Scoring Mitigation Trades, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 413, 420 (2001)
(neither buyers nor sellers of credits are “quality-conscious”).
210 See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and
the Climate Change Convention, 26 BOST. COLL. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 66 (1998)
(emissions trading divorces interest in the quality of goods from desire to purchase).
211 See id.  (“shoddy” emission credits are adequate for the purposes of companies
involved in trades if the government accepts the credits).  
212  See id.
213 See, e.g., Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Michigan
Emissions Trading Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 9264, 9267 (February 7, 2001) (noting that
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contexts.207  This was extremely common, for example, in the trading
programs preceding the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, which
involved volatile organic compounds that are not susceptible to continuous
emissions monitoring.208
The need for government approval of each trade may seem odd to
economists with vast experience in free markets and much less regulatory
experience.  Emissions trading involves a party purchasing a claim to an
emissions reduction.  But free market incentives would encourage both
parties to make false claims as often as possible.209  If one can exaggerate
the value of credits, then buyers can sell credits that cost precious little to
produce, and purchasers can get great value out of small outlays.  The
fundamental problem is that neither the buyer nor the seller care at all about
the quality of the product sold.210   Anything that satisfies the government
satisfies them.211  By contrast, if a buyer purchases a blue jeans, the buyer
cares about the quality of the jeans, because she will wear them and
experience frustration if they wear out, look bad, or shrink.212
Manufacturers frequently care about the quality of goods in the ordinary
sales context, because buyers will not purchase poor quality goods.  But
buyers of emission reduction credits will purchase poor quality credits,
absent some kind of oversight.  Hence, bad deals for the public will arise,
unless the government establishes sufficient transaction costs to purchase
information needed to distinguish good deals from bad.  Insufficient
transaction costs will tend to translate into widespread emissions fraud or
other deals that may lessen environmental quality.213    As EPA explained
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credits for shutdowns and production slow downs can cause overall emissions in a trading
program to increase beyond what they would be without trading).
214 See Proposed Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg.
39668, 39671 (August 3, 1995); Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles
for Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43814, 43817
(December 4, 1986).  
215 See RICHARD A. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFFSETS: TRADING SELLING AND
BANKING 22 (1980) (offset policy can be a “meaningless paper game for abating
pollution”); Driesen, supra note 93, at 314-16 & notes 120-127 (discussing the prevalence
of paper credits under state offset, netting, and banking programs).
216  See Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans: New Jersey
Open Market Emissions Trading Program: Revised Interpretation of Operating Permit
Requirements for Emissions Trades, 66 Fed. Reg. 1796, 1801 (January 9, 2001) (discussing
need to quantify amount of reductions a source may sell).
217 See id. (discussing need to determine “the amount of emissions by which a sources
may be exceeding . . . its permit limits.”)
218 See Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans: New Jersey
Open Market Emissions Trading Program: Revised Interpretation of Operating Permit
Requirements for Emissions Trades, 66 Fed. Reg. 1796, 1801 (January 9, 2001) (referring
to need to quantify emission reductions involved in trading)
219 In measuring any pollution reduction, one must know the emissions prior to the
reduction in order to measure the amount of the reduction.  Environmental policy-makers
refer to this state prior to a reduction as the “baseline.”  See OAR GUIDANCE, supra note
106, at 162 (defining the term “baseline”).
220 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a).
in a 1995 federal register notice, “up-front” review sought to “avoid quality
control problems” in the form of “paper trades.”214  Paper trades allow
operators to escape an applicable emission control requirement in exchange
for a claimed reduction that reflects no extra actual emission reduction.215
The first kind of information needed is quantitative.  Does the
amount of emissions reduced actually match the claims of parties selling
credits?216  Does the amount of the shortfall a purchaser aim to fill with
credits really equal the extent of non-compliance at its facility?217 Both of
these questions require information to answer.218  
At least where good information exists about baseline emissions,219
continuous monitoring makes it easy to reliably answer both of those
questions.  For that reason, the acid rain emissions trading program has
established a continuous emissions monitoring requirement, which imposes
some private transaction costs on parties participating in that program.220
The public transaction cost of debating and enacting the monitoring
requirement and the private cost of complying with the monitoring
[3/17/04 Draft]                    THE FUNCTIONS  OF TRANSACTION COSTS 46
221 See Approval of Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Illinois Emissions Trading
Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 52343, 52350 (October 15, 2001) (recognizing that measurement
difficulties create significant uncertainties in trading volatile organic compound (VOC)
emission reductions, while approving VOC trading), codified at 40 C.F.R. part 52 (2002).
222 See OAR GUIDANCE, supra note 106,  at 67 (discussing estimation procedures).
223  See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE, 253 (1979) (Pollution permit approach only feasible
if it is possible to effectively monitor pollution levels).
224  See James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl, Apples for Oranges: The Role of Currencies in
Environmental Trading Markets, 53 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2000); Wainger, King, Salzman,
and Boyd, supra note 208; Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality
Implementation Plan: New Hampshire Discrete Emissions Reduction Trading Program, 66
Fed. Reg. 9278, 9280-81 (approving of inter-pollutant trades when air quality has shown
them to have equivalent impacts).
225  See Wainger, King Salzman, and Boyd, supra note 208, at 424-26; J.B. Ruhl & R.
Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case Study of
Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVT’L L. J. 365, 366 (2001) (discussing flood
control and water quality improvement functions).
requirement obviate the need for public monitoring of each proposed
trade’s quantitative value, since good monitoring makes real compliance
extremely likely.     
When good monitoring has not been available, regulators have
sometimes allowed trading anyway.221  In such cases, the government
sometimes authorizes trades based on emissions estimates.222  In these
cases, abundant opportunities often exist to game the estimates. Buyers and
sellers of credits have incentives to use estimating techniques that
exaggerate the value of credits purchased.  While government regulators
should recognize that emissions trading is probably a bad tool where
accurate emissions measurement is not possible or not required, they often
do not.223  But they sometimes, in such cases, require hearings, so that
regulators and the public can check the estimates and try to prevent trades
based on incorrect quantification of credits or debits.  Such hearings, while
perhaps insufficient, perform the function of seeking information needed
to avoid bad deals.
Another type of information involves qualitative information about
the value of credits.  While regulators often use quantitative values as the
basis for emissions trading, the same  quantity of emission reduction, land
conserved, or effluent reduction often has different environmental value,
depending on qualitative factors.224  For example, wetlands of equivalent
size and type can vary radically in their value as wildlife habitat,
contributors to water quality, and as a means of controlling floods.225
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226 See Wainger, King, Salzman, and Boyd, supra note 208, at 424-26 (explaining how
an equivalent acreage trade may produce a bad deal for the public).
227  See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 223, at 671-687.
228 See Wainger, King, Salzman, & Boyd, supra note 208, at 471-72 (discussing data
needs for wetlands mitigation banking).
229  Cf. id. at 415 (in practice, wetlands mitigation banking “often fails to provide
wetland gains that offset wetland losses”).
230 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 223, at 627-28 (discussing “nonfungibilities of
space”).
231  See DALES, supra note 92, at 79.
232 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport
of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57356, 57459 (1998) (emissions in some areas may cause greater
effects [upon ozone levels] than emissions in another).  See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL
& WALLACE E.  OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 179 (1988) (discussing
need not to allow one-to-one trades between highly polluted and less polluted locations).
Cf.  Ruhl & Gregg, supra note 224, at 388 (discussing up-front geographic and qualitative
restrictions for wetlands mitigation banking).
233  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7503©)(1) (authorizing offsets only from equally dirty areas).
The Clean Air Act requires new and modified pollution sources to offset the emissions they
add with purchase or production of an offsetting emission reduction.  See id.  See also 42
U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(5),(c)(10),(d)(2),(e)(1) (establishing requirements to provide greater
offsets than added emissions in certain areas not meeting federal air quality standards for
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Equivalent acreage trades can be bad deals for the public.226  For that
reason, some analysts have recommended public involvement in
assessment of qualitative factors when credits are used or banked in
wetlands mitigation banking schemes.227  Absent sufficient transaction costs
to generate good qualitative information, bad deals could be very
common.228  Again, one might question the whole idea of allowing
emissions trading in this context.  But clearly trading in such a context
without transaction costs aimed at generating sufficient qualitative
information to inform public beneficiaries of the pollution reduction
program creates opportunities for bad deals that are worse environmentally
than no deals at all.229
This issue of quality often arises for geographic reasons.230   At
times, reductions in a pollutant in one area have more value than in
another.231  For example, reductions in urban smog in a big city will
probably prevent more cases of lung disease than equivalent reductions in
less populated areas.232  For that reason, regulators have usually employed
one of two options when confronted with the possibility of geographically
problematic trades.  They have sometimes restricted certain kinds of
geographically undesirable trades up front.233   At other times, they have
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ground level ozone).
234  See, e.g., Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Michigan
Emissions Trading Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 9264, 9268-69 (February 7, 2001) (requiring air
quality modeling and review to make sure that trades don’t cause violation of national
ambient air quality standards because of geographic factors)[hereinafter Michigan Trading
SIP].
235 See, e.g., Finding of Significant Contribution, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57459-60 (declining
to employ trading ratios when no party has justified particular trading ratios and geographic
boundaries).
236 See, e.g., Michigan Trading SIP, supra note 233, at 9269 (requiring public
involvement to avoid toxic hotspots through trades of volatile organic compounds).  While
I write about this issue here in terms of simply having the information to make sure that
planned environmental benefits are realized, this poses equitable issues as well.  Even if
the overall environmental impact of a trade is negligible or even positive, it may create
equity issues.  For example, trades can exacerbate already high levels of risk in minority
communities.  See generally OAR GUIDANCE,  supra note 106, at 25-26 (identifying
programs where economic efficiency issues do not overwhelm “equity issues among
communities” as important to success).  This paper contains a separate section on equity
that does not use emissions trading examples.  But equity does raise important issues in
emissions trading.  Cf.  Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 227,
281-83 (2001) (raising general equitable issues with emissions trading); Salzman & Ruhl,
supra note 223, at 627(discussing toxic hot spot problems); Stephen M. Johnson,
Economics and Equity II: The European Experience, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417 (2001);
Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111 (1999); Driesen, supra
note 209, at 71 (discussing geographic equity problems in emissions trading); David M.
Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY
L. Q. 1, 11-12 (2000) (discussing problems of international equity in international emissions
trading); Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn, and Shipra Bansal,
Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air
Quality Policy, 9 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 231 (1999); Comment, What is Good for the
Market Can be Bad for Health: Emissions Trading Under SCAQMD Rule 1610 and the
Unjust Environmental Effects, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 539 (1999).  Some transaction
costs facilitate needed attention to equitable issues in emissions trading.
required public approval of trades, so that the regulators and the public can
consider the geographic effects of particular proposed trades.234  From an
efficient markets standpoint, an a priori restriction might appear the better
option, because it minimizes uncertainty.  But sometimes a paucity of
relevant information precludes making intelligent policy for a host of
geographic (or other qualitative) problems before they arise.235  Also,
regulated parties who only care about reducing the cost of purchased credits
often prefer high transaction costs to a restricted market in credits (which
might raise prices or make credits unavailable for some projects).  But a
wide open market with insufficient transaction costs in this context invites
bad deals.236  
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237 See generally OAR GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at  21 (simple rules maximize cost
effectiveness, but equity, environmental, and enforcement concerns may force “trade off”
of some cost-effectiveness); Diller, supra note 71, at 495 (critics of government “red tape”
often fail to examine why red tape is there).
238  See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, § 404.
239 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(c)(2)(C); 7513a(e); 7651l.
240 See generally WESLEY A. MAGAT, REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 104-
105 (1982) (explaining how uncertainty about tradeoffs tends to generate high transaction
costs).
241 See, e.g., Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Michigan
Emissions Trading Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 9264, 9269 (February 7, 2001) (discussing rules
to address unpredictable choices about which hazardous air pollutants to trade in a volatile
organic compound emissions trading program).   
Responsible proposals to reduce transaction costs in this context
will adequately serve the function that high transaction costs would
otherwise serve.237    For example, the acid rain program allows
geographically distant polluters to trade without government approval of
each trade.  But the program contains several features that serve the
functions that review of trades would otherwise perform.  The Clean Air
Act required EPA to consider the desirability and feasability of a deposition
standard, which could involve geographically specific cuts to address an
important local impact.238   And the Clean Air Act authorizes states to make
additional reductions in acid rain precursors to address local and regional
health problems associated with these pollutants.239  Because acid rain is the
product of long range transport from far and wide, this solution has been
rather satisfactory.  A problem where local effects varied significantly
depending on the geography of emissions reductions would probably need
higher transaction costs to garner information about geographic affects,240
unless the regulator can foresee and plan for significant  geographic
problems through trading restrictions.241      
In short, transaction costs in the emissions trading context often
perform important functions.  One function involves developing
information to prevent bad transactions, transactions that worsen
environmental quality.  Transaction costs aid avoidance of inefficient
transaction in a wide variety of contexts.  
     
C.  Transaction Costs Producing Efficient Transactions  
Transaction costs also facilitate efficient transactions.  In part, this
facilitative function represents the flip side of the avoidance function.
Since nobody wants to make bad deals, people may well eschew a
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242 We recognize that in some circumstances buyers may respond to uncertainty about
the value of a good or service by offering a lower price.  But if the seller knows that the
product is worth more than the buyer offers, no deal will result.  Also, many buyers will
simply forego a purchase to avoid hassle if information is inadequate, regardless of price.
243 See HARRY CAUDILL, NIGHT FALLS ON THE CUMBERLANDS 36 (1962) (referring to
the "ancient . . . agricultural and hunting life" that preceded the development of "a cash
economy.") 
244 This particular example of peddlers varies from the actual history of peddling in
Appalachia in order to provide a hypothetical illustration of this article's conceptual
argument. In  NIGHT FALLS ON THE CUMBERLANDS, Harry Caudill explains that peddlers
became merchants when coal mining gave birth to towns. Id. at  108-109. Increased
transaction costs devoted to transportation played a significant role in the development of
a market economy in Appalachian economy, as this illustration suggests. MARY JEAN
BOWMAN AND W. WARREN HAYNES, RESOURCES AND PEOPLE IN EAST KENTUCKY 256
(1963). But the particular illustration of that concept through peddling comes not from
history, but from the desire to provide a concrete example that makes the concepts of the
article clear. 
245 See generally, CAUDILL, supra note 242, at 108-109(discussing peddlers in
Appalachia).
transaction absent sufficient information.242  Conversely, if transaction costs
generate sufficient information to engender confidence in the value of a
transaction, this encourages transactions.  
Transaction costs  facilitate transactions in several ways.  First,
payers of transaction costs often pay for information needed to realize a
transaction.  Second, buyers and sellers pay transaction costs that  enable
them to get together.  Absent adequate transaction costs, they cannot get
together with sufficient information to realize a transaction.
A variant upon an  historical example illustrates our point. F o r
many years, the settlers of Appalachian Kentucky had little contact with the
market economy.243  Because of this, they paid no transaction costs.
Transaction costs were zero and there was no market.  The settlers lived far
up in the hills, farmed their land, and generally bought nothing.  
Assume at that time that the price of clothing milled in the towns
was low enough so that a farmer would gladly buy it if a peddler showed
up on his land.  Since no peddler showed up, however, the farmers did not
know of the possibility and no market exchange took place.244  
At some point, however, farmers did begin to purchase clothing
made elsewhere.  Let us assume that peddlers began to show up, so that
farmers became aware of the opportunity to buy clothing.245  In this
scenario, actual expenditures upon transaction costs have risen to the point
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246 See ROBERT S. WEISE, GRASPING AT INDEPENCE: DEBT, MALE AUTHORITY, AND
MINERAL RIGHTS IN APPALACHIAN KENTUCKY, 1850-1915 103 (2001) (discussing poor
transportation and rugged terrain as obstacles to "free distribution of goods and hard
money"). 
247 BOWMAN & HAYNES, supra note 243, at 256 (discussing relationship between
transportation  infrastructure  and market development in Eastern Kentucky). 
248 See NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 138, at 109 (“Rational ignorance is not just
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one cannot know everything one needs to know in order to make a decision); KREPS, supra
note 4, at 744-747, 771.
249 See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives:  Myths, Models, and
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where a market is possible.  Under the prior subsistence regime, actual
expenditure of transaction costs ($0) had been too low to permit a market.
Our suggestion that transaction costs can be too low to permit
efficient markets will appear very counterintuitive to most economists.
They would probably say that during the time of subsistence transaction
costs were too high to permit the development of markets.  In saying this,
however, they speak not of actual expenditures upon transaction costs, but
of phantom transaction costs.  That is, they imagine a different market than
the one that exists, the market of the peddler and store bought clothing.
Since this market does not exist, the cost of trading may be too high to
permit it.  Phantom transaction costs, not actual expenditures, are too high.
One can make some assumptions that would validate the picture this
phantom draws.  Travel into the hills of Appalachia was too expensive.
Nobody could afford this clothing if the price must also include the cost of
paying peddlers to carry the clothing up the rocky sides of rivers to the
farms.246  But once the railroad came (or the cars, or the bicycles), the
transaction cost dropped and a viable market came into being.247  
If one assumes perfect information and rational profit-maximizing
behavior then this picture must be correct.  This phantom comes to us from
the world of perfect markets.  
But institutional economics teaches that people and organizations
live in a world of bounded rationality.248  They cannot possibly pay
attention to everything, so they develop rules of thumb to guide what they
will pay attention to.249  Thus, the merchant in town might pay attention to
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Micromarkets,  80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 556 (2002) (human attention is a scarce resource,
which must be selectively allocated).
his neighbors within the town, his suppliers, and his family, but devote no
attention at all to the possibilities for peddlers and farmers.  
It might be that the phantom cost, the cost the shopkeeper would
have paid to send a salesman into the hills during the subsistence period
equals the real transaction cost that a different shopkeeper finally does pay
to send a salesperson up into the hills during the time of trade.  In that case,
the phantom transaction cost remains constant and cannot explain anything.
The time of subsistence ended when actual transaction costs rose to a level
sufficient to create a market.  
When Coase defines transaction costs as the costs of using the
market mechanism, he understates his point.  No market mechanism exists
to use without the expenditure of transaction costs.  When transaction costs
become too low, markets cease to function.  People make transactions
across time (contract) and space (peddler) when they spend sufficient
transaction costs to realize an exchange.
Another way of appreciating the role of transaction costs in creating
markets is to think of transaction costs as part of a side transaction -
payment for a good or service that only exists to aid another transaction.
The merchant in our example may pay the peddler to carry goods into the
hills.  This payment, if rational, would imply that the merchant derives
some benefit from the payment of this transaction cost.  That benefit would
be realization of beneficial transactions that would not occur but for the
payment.  Indeed, the traditional assumption of neoclassical economics,
perfect information and rationality, if applied to the side transaction, would
justify an assumption that transaction costs purchase benefits at least
commensurate with the transaction cost.  Thus, they aid, rather than
impede, efficient bargains, at least under standard neoclassical assumptions.
   
Information and information asymmetries play a crucial role in both
creating markets and showing that transaction costs create markets.  If the
town merchant is unaware of potential customers in the hills, he might pay
the peddler for information about these customers.  This payment might be
essential to the transaction.  Indeed, the peddler, when he shows up in the
hills, provides information about the goods to the customers in the hills that
would be unavailable otherwise. The development of markets in this
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example rests on the differences in information among parties and
intermediaries.  Trade was hampered because parties were not aware of the
existence of potential trading partners.   This variant of our example
underscores the basis of transaction costs in problems of acquiring and
assessing information.  But even where the payer of transaction costs
obtains something other than information (such as physical access to known
customers), it helps create transactions that otherwise might not exist.  
We do not mean to deny that high transaction costs can sometimes
impede transactions.  But that possibility does not distinguish transaction
costs from productions costs (or any other cost).  If production costs for a
particular good are high, few people may purchase that good.  Nevertheless,
nobody argues that we should eliminate production costs.  We recognize
that we need production costs to produce goods.  We also need transaction
costs to sell them in a market.
Transaction costs make possible efficient transactions that otherwise
would not occur.  Indeed, markets would perish without them. 
D.  Transaction Costs as a Supplier of Dignity and Equity
Because public policy involves more than just efficiency,
transaction costs sometimes play a role in realizing other values.
Transaction costs often pay for processes that affirm individual dignity or
aid the realization of equitable goals.  
1.  DIGNITARY THEORIES OF DUE PROCESS
Jerry Mashaw has criticized the Supreme Court’s emphasis on
avoiding error as the sole value that due process serves (when the Court
considers adding transaction costs to public processes).250  He argues that
process must protect individual dignity by satisfying “democratic
morality’s demand” that an individual have an opportunity to participate in
decisions that affect her.251  
This dignitary approach suggests that transaction costs sometimes
purchase legitimacy for a process - a feeling that the process is fair and
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Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 580 (1997) (explaining that
Kaldor-Hicks efficient public policy lacks “the attractive consensual” features of “free
market exchange.”).
255 Cf. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING THE
VALUES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 54-55 (2000) (because changes in market structure
influence social and cultural relationships, we should view markets as a place of “meaning
and value formation.”).
256 See Dahlquist, supra note 89 (discussing in detail the equitable factors that govern
(continued...)
respectful.252  This seems especially relevant when an involuntary
transaction is involved.253  For in this situation, the individual cannot affirm
her dignity by simply rejecting a proposed transaction.  Instead, absent
some transaction cost, government may impose an order greatly affecting
her life without even hearing what she has to say about it.254
One might analogize the function of transaction costs paying for
dignity to some types of preferences for market transactions.  It is not clear
that everybody prefers the most transaction cost free approach to ordinary
market transactions.  Some people might prefer to shop at a small store
where idle conversation with the owner (a transaction cost in the form of
an expenditure of time) forms part of the transaction.255  They may feel less
alienation having been heard than they do if they simply make a purchase
on the internet or by choosing merchandise alone from a shelf.  And in
many cultures, haggling over the price, inefficient as that may be, forms
part of a ritual affirming the dignity of the participants in the transaction.
This does not deny the value of shopping malls and internet
shopping.  It just means that buyers shopping with sellers offering lower
transaction costs lose the functions that the higher transaction costs
associated with more personable transactions might  purchase.   
But this function of reducing alienation through personal interaction
seems especially important when a transaction is involuntary.  For in that
situation, an especially high risk of alienation exists.  
2.  TRANSACTION COSTS UNDER CERCLA
Many transaction costs under CERCLA serve the function of
equitably apportioning liability.256  This might seem like a paradoxical
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apportionment of liability).  See also Van Cleve, supra note 88, at 10134 n. 2 (defining
transaction costs as costs “incurred in resolving” liability disputes).
257 See United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-810 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(announcing rule of joint and several liability subject to an exception where a party can
prove that harm is divisible); H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 74 (1985),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856 (confirming Chem-Dyne principle); United
States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 161, 171 n. 23 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989) (recognizing that Congress confirmed joint and several liability); In re Bell
Petroleum, 3 F.3d 889, 901-903 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
964 F.2d 252, 267-269 (3d Cir. 1992) (characterizing CERCLA liability as apparently
unfair); O’Neill v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989); PROBST & PORTNEY, supra note 81, at 9 (“Joint and several liability mean that,
generally, any one PRP could be held responsible for the entire scope of a site cleanup.”)
[italics omitted]; Oswald, supra note 79, at 591 (noting that strict liability implies that
parties not morally culpable will nevertheless be liable).  
258 See Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 884 (9th Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (discussing enforcement policy and statutory provisions seeking to avoid a
“parade of horribles”); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1205 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(EPA only enforces against large contributors or PRPs with capacity to pay); Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-499) S. 51, reprinted in A
Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,
October 1990) 468 (testimony of EPA Administrator Lee Thomas) (discussing information
gathering to determine the “full extent of liaibility” in the context of settlement) [emphasis
added].  Cf. McGee, supra note 88, at 174 (suggesting that EPA inequitably pursues large
companies with “deep pockets” more agressively than waste generators most responsible
for hazardous waste).  McGee notes, however, that parties with deep pockets have
ameliorated this unfairness by bringing contribution actions against other PRPs, while
suggesting that putting big companies in a position where they need to sue is unfair.  See
id.
259 See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994) (discussing how
Congress incorporated common law contribution actions into CERCLA); Meghrig v. KFC
Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (CERCLA authorizes one PRP to sue another for
contribution).  See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser and Richard L. Revesz, Settlements
under Joint and Several Liability, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 427, 436-37 n. 36 (1993) (citing to
cases and statutory provision establishing the right of contribution and comparing it to
other federal common law addressing contribution).
statement, since CERCLA imposes strict, joint and several liability upon
PRPs, meaning that EPA can hold any one PRP responsible for the entire
cost of cleanup (except in the rare case when a party can demonstrate that
harm is divisible).257  In practice, however, EPA does consider the degree
of responsibility various PRPs should bear for hazardous waste sites in
negotiations apportioning liability and choosing which defendants to
aggressively target.258  Moreover, assignment of joint and several liability
is only the tip of the iceberg.  PRPs can bring contribution actions to avoid
cost and fob it off on other PRPs.259  And a variety of equitable factors
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260 Many courts employ the “Gore factors,” named after a proposal of then-Senator
Albert Gore, to apportion liability among PRPs in contribution actions.  Dahlquist, supra
note 89, at 11099.  These factors include (1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that
their contribution to a discharge, release, or disposal of hazardous waste can be
distinguished; (2) the amount of hazardous waste involved; (3) the degree of toxicity of the
waste; (4) the degree of involvement by the parties in generation, transportation, treatment,
storage or disposal of the waste; (5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with regard
to the waste involved, taking into account the characteristics of the waste; and (6) the
degree of cooperation by the parties with government officials to prevent harm to public
health and the environment.  See United States v. Colorado & E.R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536
n.5 (10th Cir. 1995).  This list of factors, however, is not exclusive.  See id. at 1536 (courts
may consider the “totality of the circumstances”); Dahlquist, supra note 89, at 11099
(describing non-Gore factors frequently considered by district courts).
261 See Colorado & E.R.R., 50 F.3d at 1536 n. 5; Eugene Martin-Leff, The Common
Law Ancestry of Superfund Liability, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 53, 59 (1996-97)
(we can achieve a high degree of fairness through extensive discovery and expert analysis,
thus raising transaction cost).
262 Accord Dahlquist, supra note 89, at 11103 (it is “often difficult, or even impossible,
to determine each party’s relative contribution to the environmental problem.”).
263 See David B. Spence, Imposing Individual Liability as a Legislative Policy Choice:
Holmesian “Intuitions” and Superfund Reform, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 389, 430 (1999) (noting
“the typical lack of information about Superfund site histories”).
264 See Martin-Leff, supra note 260, at 59 (stating that nobody would support such a
solution).
govern these contribution actions.260  In general, CERCLA seeks to
apportion liability among PRPs in a manner at least roughly proportionate
to responsibility for waste.  
This equitable principle makes it necessary to generate information
about a wide variety of past activity, such as arrangements for disposal,
amounts of hazardous waste dumped at sites by various parties, and the
degree of knowledge various parties had about dumping.261  A hazardous
waste dump does not tell us who participated in the activities leading to the
problem.262  Often figuring out who did what involves enormous expense
and only yields partial answers.263
One can see this equitable function most easily by imagining how
one might reduce transaction costs.  Suppose that one simply established
a rule that each PRP would pay an equal portion of cleanup costs,
permitting no right of contribution to reallocate costs based upon equitable
principles and no ad hoc adjustment by EPA through settlement.264  If ten
parties were potentially responsible for one site’s waste, which cost $1
million to clean up, then each PRP would pay $100,000.  Such a rule would
simply and easily eliminate many of the transaction costs arising under
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265 Cf. PROBST & PORTNEY, supra note 81, at 13-14 (discussing transaction costs
associated with apportioning liability).
266 Cf. Federal News Service, June 27, 1995 (Prepared Statement of Lois J. Schiffer,
Assistant Attorney General Environmental and Natural Resources Division, Department
of Justice, before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Subcommittee
on Water Resources and Environment Concerning Superfund Reauthorization) (most of the
high transaction costs come from contribution actions)[hereinafter, Schiffer Statement].
267 In pointing out that concern for fairness generates significant transaction costs, I do
not mean to assert that Superfund sufficiently attends to fairness considerations.  There is
great controversy about whether Superfund adequately meets fairness goals.  See Spence,
supra note 262.  But it remains true that transaction costs finance the difference between
the current level of unfairness in Superfund and the much greater unfairness that would
result from a proposal that made no attempt to address fairness at all.  
Professor Spence argues that joint and several liability generates the transaction costs
that arise in disputes at multiparty sites.  See id. at 419.  But I have shown above that with
respect to some very significant transaction costs, the possibility of equitable discretion in
settlement or contribution, not the joint and several liability, generate most of the
transaction costs.  Cf. Howard F. Chang and Hilary Sigman, Incentives to Settle Under
Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 205, 231 (2000) (joint and several liability likely encourages settlement and therefore
lowers transaction costs).  Elimination of contribution and enforcement discretion would
leave only the private transaction costs associated with identifying PRPs (excluding the
transaction costs surrounding remedy selection, which are, for the most part separable from
the liability regime).  Cf. Martin-Leff, supra note 260, at 60-61 (citing the “Gore” factors
and other opportunities for apportionment as the source of significant ambiguity and
transaction costs)  Indeed, the only category of transaction costs that Spence identifies in
this portion of his argument, are “associated with recovering money” from other PRPs.
Spence, supra note 262, at 419.  These costs arise solely from contribution and would not
exist if the equitable right to contribution were eliminated, even if joint and several liability
were retained.
268 See Lyons, supra note 88, at 331.
CERCLA.265  Most information about parties’ past activities would become
irrelevant to liability.  So parties would not need to produce information
about who brought which waste in what quantity to sites.266  Nobody would
care about whether property owners knew about or encouraged dumping.
And no debates about who bore the most responsibility would be relevant.
So, there would be little need for the elaborate lawyering and negotiating
that goes on around apportionment of liability.267
Parties would remain interested in researching the history of non-
parties under this rule, because additional parties would reduce pro-rata
shares.268  If we did not care about equity, however, we could simply bar
contribution actions and eliminate these transaction costs.  
[3/17/04 Draft]                    THE FUNCTIONS  OF TRANSACTION COSTS 58
269 See Martin-Leff, supra note 260, at 59 (nobody would support this solution).
270 See Cleve, supra note 88, at 10134 (Congressional debate has focused upon
reducing transaction costs while fairly and expeditiously resolving liability disputes); Ellen
J. Garnber, Federal Common Law of Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amendments,
14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365, 380 (1987) (Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 “reinforces policies regarding fairness”)   
271 See PROBST & PORTNEY, supra note 81, at 16 (discussing equitable principal that
parties handling hazardous waste in similar ways deserve similar treatment).
272 See ID. (fairness if often equated with the “polluter pays” principle).
273 See ID. at viii (listing five policy options); Steinzor, supra note 84 (discussing the
public works alternative).  
274 See Lyons, supra note 88, at 272-73 (offering public works alternative); Rena I.
Steinzor, The Reauthorization of Superfund: Can the Deal of the Century be Saved?, 25
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10016, 10018 (1995) (discussing industry interest in a
public works approach).
275 Representatives have introduced bills to eliminate or limit retroactive liability in
many recent Congresses.  See Spence, supra note 262, at 395 (discussing proposals in the
103d, 104th, and 105th Congress); John Copeland Nagle, Cercla’s Mistakes, 38 WILLIAM
& MARY L. REV. 1405, 1454 (1997) (discussing failed effort to repeal retroactive liability;
Chang & Sigman, supra note 266, at 205 (all major proposals for Superfund reauthorization
would restrict joint and several liability).
276 See Spence, supra note 262, at 392-93 (CERCLA’s defenders view it as
(continued...)
Nobody has seriously proposed this solution to CERCLA’s
transaction cost problem.269  But it is worth considering why not.  The
answer must be that this solution does not meet a basic test that Congress
has applied to reform proposals, that of fairness.270  Under this proposal, the
owner who was a victim of midnight dumping faces the same liability as
the dumper.  This profoundly violates one’s sense of fairness.271  The law
recognizes a general principle of personal responsibility, that one should
clean up one’s own mess.272  While this principle becomes very difficult to
apply when many contributors help create a mess over a long period of
time, the principle still has strong appeal.  And the transaction costs pay for
efforts to come close to implementing this principle.  If we did not care
about this principle, then we could easily eliminate many transaction costs.
  
Insurers, PRPs and some academics have proposed other solutions
to the Superfund transaction cost problem.273  For example, the government
could pay for cleanup and not make PRPs responsible.274  This public works
proposal, however, also highlights the fact that transaction costs pay for
equity.  Congress has debated variants of this proposal, principally a
proposal to limit retroactive liability.275  It has concluded, however, that
fairness and the personal responsibility principle requires that those most
directly responsible for the problem should pay for the cleanup.276  The
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approximating the “polluter pays” principle as closely as possible); United States v. Mexico
Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 486 (8th Cir. 1992) (CERCLA’s prime objective is to place
the cost of cleanup on “those responsible for creating or maintaining the hazardous
condition.”).  Fairness has not been the only consideration behind opposition to variants
of the public works proposal.  Absent vast increases tax expenditures, the elimination of
retroactive liability alone would greatly reduce funding of cleanup.  See Spence,  supra
note 262, at 396.  
277 See Oswald, supra note 79, at 593 (strict liability rests on the rationale that the party
creating the harm should bear the costs associated with the activity creating the harm).
This rests in part on a fairness rationale, see id. at 593-94, and in part on an efficiency
rationale, see id. at 594-95.
278 See, e.g., McGee, supra note 88 (calling for a repeal of Superfund).
279 See Lyons, supra note 88, at 341-42 (defining the issue raised by a public works
proposal as whether the ends of corrective justice and prevention of unjust enrichment
justifies the transaction costs of the liability system). 
280 See, e.g., PROBST & PORTNEY, supra note 81, at 40-41 (noting that public works
solution would involve an “enormous reduction in transaction costs,” but questioning its
fairness); Spence, supra note 262, at 429 (“any solution must balance the goal of fairness
against transaction cost concerns.”); Lyons, supra note 88, at 338-42 (proposing to raise
taxes on PRPs and arguing about whether fairness requires continued liability in that
context).
281 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental
Regulation, 87 GEO. L. J. 749, 750 (1999) (pointing out that public choice theory has
trouble explaining the existence of environmental regulation, which serves diffuse public
interests at the expense of well organized groups).
282 See PROBST & PORTNEY, supra note 81, at 21 (identifying the site study and remedy
selection processes as sources of cleanup delay “factors apart from the liability system.”).
taxpayer should not have to bear the full cost of cleanup.277  Some
commentators have challenged this view.278  But the most responsible
challenges do not rest on the principle of reducing transaction cost alone.279
Rather, they take into account the equitable argument about who should
pay.280  
Notice that the Congressional view does not represent a capitulation
to special interests.  Rather, contrary to the predictions of public choice
theory, Congress has consistently denied the special interests the basic
relief they seek, in favor of the general public interest in avoiding
widespread diffuse taxpayer liability and affirming a personal responsibility
norm.281  But the main point remains, transaction costs here purchase rough
equity.
One cannot claim, however, that all of Superfund’s transaction costs
come from the liability regime’s preference for equity.282  Many of the
problems stem from technical difficulties in choosing remedies that must
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283 See Reina L. Steinzor and Linda E. Greer, In Defense of the Superfund Liability
Scheme: Matching the Diagnosis and the Cure, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10286,
10287 (1997). 
284 These costs can be significant.  See Robert H. Abrams, Using Experience to
Improve Superfund Remedy Selection, 29 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 581, 582 (1995) (the
remedy selection process can cost millions of dollars).
285 See Steinzor & Greer, supra note 282, at 10288. See also Abrams, supra note 283,
at 586-86 (explaining why remedy selection is so time consuming and expensive).
286 See Probst, supra note 88, at 67 (PRPs conduct their own studies in order to
persuade EPA to choose less expensive remedies); Lyons, supra note 88, at 319-26; Hilary
Sigman, The Pace of Progress at Superfund Sites: Policy Goals and Interest Group
Influence, 44 J. L. & ECON. 315, 334 (2001) (sites without PRPs clean up more rapidly than
other sites). Lyons discusses the need to come to an agreement with EPA about site
remediation as a source of transaction costs as well.  This transaction cost comes from
EPA’s tendency to seek PRP cooperation first.  It has legal authority to clean up first and
then bring a cost recovery action without any discussion of what the remedy should look
like.  The possibility of the PRP contesting the remedy probably contributes to the tendency
to negotiate first and cleanup later (which has been the predominant approach during much,
but not all, of Superfund’s history).  
287 See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (requiring protective and cost effective remedies).
288 That is not to say that reduction of these transaction costs is impossible.
See Abrams, supra note 283, at 583-584 (discussing the possibility of establishing “generic
remedies” as a means of reducing the cost of remedy selection).  Cf. id. at 597-601
(continued...)
vary with site specific conditions that resist easy evaluation.283  Here,
transaction costs serve the function of providing the information needed to
allow for an informed remedial decision.284  Evaluation of remedies for
large sites filled with “unknown combinations of hundreds of chemicals”
sitting on top of “networks of aquifers and other complex geological
features” that affect exposure of surrounding (and possibly distant)
neighborhoods poses an enormously daunting time-consuming task,
regardless of who pays for or conducts cleanup.285  Strict liability in the
service of equity, however, does add some incremental transaction costs to
the remedy selection process, by giving PRPs an interest in contesting
expensive remedies.286
Transaction costs pay for the generation of information that inform
the selection of effective and cost effective remedies.287  If one did not care
about whether the remedies adequately protect human health or the
environment or whether they cost too much, then little analysis would be
needed prior to cleanup of Superfund sites.  As it is, however, a time
consuming investigative and negotiation process precedes the selection of
remedies.  The transaction costs pay for the selection of reasonably priced
but effective remedies.288
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(explaining why generic remedies may not help in many situations and themselves generate
fairly high transaction costs).
289 See BARRY BOZEMAN, BUREAUCRACY AND RED TAPE, 8 (2000) (red tape arises
from demands for accountability of government officials).
290 See id. at 124 (explaining that the objective a rule is meant to serve can change,
thereby making a perfectly good rule into useless red tape). 
Viewing the selection of remedies as a transaction (albeit an
involuntary one), one might say that these transaction costs avoid bad
transactions.  They avoid selection of inefficient remedies or remedies that
do not serve public interests adequately.     
In sum, transaction costs purchase something of value to the
purchaser.  They allow the avoidance of inefficient or unfair transactions
and increase the likelihood of fair and efficient transactions.  
III.  WHITHER TRANSACTION COST MINIMIZATION?
Since transaction costs purchase something of value, either equity,
access to a welfare enhancing exchange, or information necessary to avoid
bad deals, we ought not reflexively eliminate them.  Our theory recognizes
that elimination of some transaction costs might prove desirable.  For
example, if a particular transaction cost serves no function at all, it
constitutes waste and deserves elimination.  But, as we have explained,
under standard neoclassical assumptions, people usually have reasons for
spending money on side transactions, so transaction costs will often
perform some function.  Even in the government context, people usually
create administrative processes to perform some functions.289  While
processes can outlive their usefulness, eliminating them without analyzing
their utility for the purposes they were designed for constitutes error.290
This part addresses the implications for legal theory of recognizing the
benefits that transaction costs purchase.  
 
A.  Taking the Benefits Transaction Costs Purchase Into Account
Legal scholars and policy makers must take transaction cost
functions into account in deciding whether to reduce or increase transaction
costs.  We will briefly suggest why this is essential and then develop some
suggestions about how to identify transaction cost functions.
We have already explained that payers of transaction costs obtain
information that allows them to facilitate efficient transactions, avoid
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inefficient transactions, and make decisions advancing equity.  It follows
that policy-makers and scholars should consider the possibility that
reducing transaction costs might make transactions less efficient or less
equitable, because reducing (or eliminating) transaction costs can reduce
(or eliminate) the corollary benefits.
Identifying the functions transaction costs serve involves inquiring
into why parties  pay these costs and what they hope to get from them.
Many transaction costs arise because people decide that they need
information in order to make decisions.  We can begin by noticing what
sorts of information the transaction costs generate.  We can then ask
ourselves why are they generating this information?  Who will use the
information and for what purpose?  What values of decision-makers
(whether buyers or public officials) create the demand for this information?
Answers to these questions reveal the functions particular transaction costs
serve.
For example, some a person considering the purchase of a used cars
may ask an auto mechanics to inspect a promising vehicle.  She does this
in order to make sure that she knows whether the vehicle has serious
defects before purchasing it.  She will use this information to decide
whether to purchase the vehicle and what price to pay.  The prospective
purchaser wants to make sure that she gets a vehicle that meets her needs
and has a value at least equal to the price.  In other words, this sort of
transaction cost aids avoidance of bad transactions and creation of an
efficient bargain.  
Some PRPs involved in Superfund sites spend vast sums of money
trying to figure out who dumped what and why.  This information can
inform equitable decisions apportioning liability in contribution actions.
The law makes such information relevant to these actions to facilitate
equitable apportionment of liability.  This transaction cost aids equitable
decision making.  This information method facilitates understanding of
transaction cost functions for particular transaction costs.
This information method provides a useful framework, but we need
to say a little more about its limitations, its needs, and its value.  First, it
does not directly address transaction costs that have nothing to do with
generating information.  Since so many significant transaction costs arise
from informational needs, this method would prove very helpful, even if
this limitation prevented its use in other contexts completely.  But
analogues to this method will apply even outside of a purely informational
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291 Furthermore, in practice enforcement will involve substantial information
acquisition costs.
context.  For example, this method does not address enforcement costs
directly.  An analog of this method, however, might function adequately in
non-informational contexts.  Just as we ask who needs information for what
purpose, we might ask who needs enforcement and for what purpose.291 We
acknowledge that legal theory needs more work on how to reliably and
precisely identify transaction costs functions, but we have offered a useful
first cut.
B. Reduction of Transaction Cost is not Always Justified
Transaction costs should remain in place, at least when they
purchase benefits sufficient to justify them.  Eliminating transaction costs
poses risks of eliminating or impairing valuable functions.  Indeed, at times
we may wish to raise transaction costs.
While scholars sometimes endorse eliminating transaction costs,
they more frequently write about the desirability of “minimizing” them or
“reducing them as much as possible.”  We believe that those locutions
reflect a view that some level of transaction cost is inevitable.  The question
then, might be, what is the optimum level.  
Theoretically, the notion that transaction costs are inevitable is
wrong.  We can, for example, eliminate the licensing costs associated with
copyrighted material by eliminating copyright.  This would eliminate the
transaction costs by eliminating the transactions that generate them.  The
inevitability idea must reflect a view that we must pay some transaction
costs to realize some benefits.  If we wish to trade with people living far
away, we must pay the transaction costs necessary to bring them together.
If we think that intellectual property rights aid production of intellectual
work, then we must set up regimes generating sufficient transaction costs
to make the needed transactions viable.  
We want to bring the parties to transactions together as cheaply as
possible.  In that sense, we do want to minimize transaction costs.  But we
want to reduce them to the lowest level needed to perform the function of
facilitating sufficient communication to realize beneficial transactions.  We
do not really mean that we want to or should eliminate transaction costs.
We mean we want to realize transaction cost functions that we find
important at the lowest possible price.
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292 See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 533, 560 (1998) (different
treatment of ambiguous terms and incomplete terms rests on differences in transaction
costs); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract By First-Party Insurers, 25 J. LEG.
STUD. 405, 431 (1996) (ambiguity in terms of a contract explained by transaction costs).
293 See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3.10 (4th
ed. 1998) (discussing treatment of ambiguities in contract); Posner, supra note 291, at 560
(arguing for strict treatment of ambiguities under parol evidence rule).
294 See BOZEMAN, supra note 288, at 10-12 (defining red tape as rules serving no
function and suggesting that such rules deserve elimination).
295 Cf. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1220 (arguing that Pareto superior moves eliminating
transaction costs are unlikely to exist).
We believe that a number of legal rules can be explained by using
information tracing to identify the function of a transaction cost, and
recognizing why courts or legislatures might choose to increase, rather than
minimize transaction costs.  Parties negotiating contracts often use
ambiguity to lower transaction costs.  Ambiguous language can hide issues
that might otherwise require lengthy negotiation to resolve.292  Yet, courts,
as a matter of policy, discourage such ambiguity by holding that
ambiguities will be construed against the drafters of documents.293  This
policy of construing ambiguity against drafters may raise transaction costs
by encouraging clearly drafted documents that may raise issues requiring
negotiation to resolve.  But it promotes beneficial transactions that permit
the transfer of information about terms that the non-drafting party may not
have recognized as ambiguous.  The rule encourages efficient transactions
by  generating sufficient transaction costs to allow a good deal based on
adequate information.  
This does not negate the value of trying to eliminate useless
transaction costs where they exist.294  But transaction costs often pay for
something of value, and therefore may not merit elimination or even
reduction in many circumstances.295
C.  Improving Transaction Cost Minimization Analysis 
Careful thinking about when  a transaction cost minimization
rationale justifies existing legal rules or legal reforms requires some
additional elements.  Neil Komesar has emphasized one such element, the
need for comparative analysis  Our functional approach aids that kind of
analysis.  We also believe that recognition of the limits of transaction cost
analysis is needed.  We take up both of these issues in turn.  
1.  ON THE NEED FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
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296 See, e.g., McCluskey, supra note 73, at ___ (while advocates of welfare reform
touted reductions in “federal red tape,” devolution has augmented state “red tape”);
BOZEMAN, supra note 288, at 125-126 (contrasting view of privatization as the only
solution to "red tape" with questions about whether private organizations might, in some
circumstances, have more red tape than government). Cf. Manjusha P Kulkarni, Susan
Fendell, and Erica Berry, Public Health and Private Profits: A Witch’s Brew, 35
CLEARNINGHOUSE REV. 629, 640 (2002) (discussing state payments to a managed care
company for administrative expenses).
297 See, e.g., Marchant, supra note 107, at 644-48. 
298 See, e.g., DALES, supra note 92, at 98 (emissions trading is impracticable for diffuse
pollution); BAUMOL & OATES,  supra note 231, at 190 (ideal package includes a mixture
of regulatory instruments); Hahn & Stavins, supra note 94, at 15 (“The best set of policies
will involve a mix of market and more conventional regulatory processes”).  
299  See, e.g., OSBORNE & GABLER, supra note 72 (giving numerous examples of
privatization); Savas, supra note 70 (advocating and giving many examples of
privatization).
300 See, e.g., Prisons, supra note 72, at 1883-84 (discussing examples of private prisons
that suffered loss of threatened loss of their contracts after serious problems surfaced in
their prisons). 
Transaction cost analysis has often been one-sided.  It looks at the
desirability of reducing private transaction costs or public transaction costs,
but rarely examines the tradeoff between the two. But selection of legal
rules often entails raising some transaction costs in order to lower others.
This problem permeates some of the literature on privatizing,
devolving, or reducing social services.  The literature decries the “red tape”
involved in administering social services (what we call public transaction
costs), but does not look as seriously at the public or private transaction
costs associated with a proposed alternative.296  In emissions trading, the
converse sometimes occurs.  The literature usually decries the private
transaction cost in the trading regime, but evinces little concern about the
public transaction cost involved in monitoring trades.297  The better
economists have recognized for many years that these transaction costs
justify refusing to establish trading regimes in many contexts.298  But some
trading proponents ignore these concerns.
The analysis of problems on the borderline between public and
private functions especially needs the kind of functional analysis we have
called for, with a twist.  These days, recommendations to privatize formerly
public functions abound.299 But private entities’ profit motives may disserve
relevant public functions.300  Thus, for example, privately operated prisons
may have much more interest in efficiently warehousing prisoners, than in
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301 See id. at 1887 (citing reports of private prisons housing maximum-security
prisoners with the general population).  Nevertheless, a recent Harvard Developments note
concluded that private prisons perform reasonably well and can prove more responsive to
problems than public prisons in some circumstances.  See id. at 1886-87.  But the note
linked this to government caring about activities in prison, and to effective monitoring.  See
id. at 1886-90.
302 See id. at 1874 (referring to government costs in preparing and monitoring contracts
with private prisons).  
303 See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation, 33 ENVT’L
L. REP. (Envt’l L. Inst.) 10094, 10097 (2003); Malloy, supra note ?, at 542-43; Driesen,
supra note 209, at 42.  
304 Cf. Savas, supra note 70, at 1737 (identifying an essential task as managing private
participation in delivery of public services in ways that “protect public interests” while still
allowing a reasonable return on investment); Louise G. Trubek, Old Wine in New Bottles:
Public Interest Lawyering in an Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1739, 1746-
49 (2001) (describing methods for assuring accountability in privatization); Beerman, supra
note 74, at 1553-56 (expressing concern that absent application of the Freedom of
Information Act and the Administrative Procedure Act to private entities and government
contracts with them, government accountability may diminish); Jody Freeman, The Private
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L.REV. 543 (2000) (discussing accountability issues
in privatization from an administrative law perspective); Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual
Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts
for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1559 (2001).. 
305 See, e.g., JOHN A. O’LOONEY, OUTSOURCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SERVICES: DECISION-MAKING STRATEGIES AND MANAGEMENT METHODS 31 (1998)
(discussing need to design and monitor effective service contracts).
safeguarding constitutional rights or providing rehabilitation.301  Often
efforts to address these problems involve creating public and private
transaction costs to align private incentives with public needs.302  
A similar problem arises in emissions trading.  Private parties want
the cheapest trade, not the trade that most surely safeguards the
environmental harm reduction obligation being traded.303  Government
should impose sufficient transaction costs to address this problem (although
transaction costs may appropriately be less for trading of some pollutants
than of others).  
This need to generate transaction costs to align private incentives
with public goals should form part of the analysis of privatization
schemes.304  And recognizing the functions that transaction costs form will
help here in reverse.  Analysts can identify the information needed to
perform crucial public functions and consider the transaction cost that must
be added in deciding whether a privatization alternative is worthwhile and
how to design potentially worthwhile privatization initiatives.305 
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306 See Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 421 (arguing that courts may have ignored much
of the transaction cost thinking in nuisance literature, because they know that away rights
after judicial resolution of nuisance claims will not occur).  
307 Accord KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 12, at 22 (“as the number
of parties increase” judicial tasks become “more difficult”).
308 See David M. Driesen, Loose Canons:  Statutory Construction and the "New"
Nondelegation Doctrine, 66 PITT. L. REV. 1 (2002) (explaining why  Congress often
delegates authority to administrative agencies).
Notice that comparative analysis requires creation of phantoms.
One must compare a regime’s current transaction costs to those of a
proposed reform regime to know whether a recommended reform is
desirable.  While there has been some criticism of use of phantoms that are
really phantasmas - constructs that would never come into existence in the
real world no matter what the legal regime306 - some careful use of
phantoms is essential to comparative analysis.  
And in comparing public to private solutions to problems, analyzing
the kinds of information public entities and private bodies might need to
make good functional decisions constitutes an important first step.  Indeed,
this approach can explain some fundamental features of public law.    
Transaction cost analysis employing the functional information
approach that we have developed can help explain the preference for public
law in some areas and private law in others, and even choices about which
public entities have what roles.  In this way, it can extend previous work on
comparative analysis by Dixit, Cooter, and others.  
For example, in the nuisance example, if the size of the population
affected by the alleged nuisance or the number of entities producing the
alleged nuisance is large, the  transaction costs of negotiating and resolving
the conflict may prevent private bargaining.  It may also make judicial
resolution awkward, for the transaction costs involved in making clear the
precise effects of many pollution sources on many people may challenge
the capacities of courts.307  While a legislature can develop information to
appreciate the broad contours of such a problem, the friction associated
with legislative processes and the limits of legislative information gathering
may preclude detailed resolutions of such problems.  This may help explain
both why legislatures have a prominent role in addressing environmental
problems and why agencies make a lot of the detailed implementation
decisions.308  A transaction cost analysis of public law using the tools we
have developed would extend beyond the question of aggregation to issues
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309 See, e.g. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 12, at 102-105.
of internal dynamics and workings of agencies and other political
institutions.
2.  ON THE LIMITS OF TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS
Finally, transaction cost analysis cannot tell us whether transactions
(including public decisions) are desirable.  The idea of undesirable
transactions played a key role in our analysis showing of transaction cost
functions in part two.    This idea may seem trivial.  Everybody who has
bought a used car knows about the possibility of transactions that do not
bring net benefits to the purchaser.  And the literature on externalities
recognizes that market transactions can prove socially undesirable even
when it provides net benefits to a limited set of participants.309  For some
consequences of a market transaction do not concern the parties to the
transaction and remain external to it (hence, the word externalities).
Pollution is often cited as an example of an externality.  Public decisions
can also go awry and produce counterproductive results. But  the idea that
market transactions at least are inherently desirable seems to loom large in
the law and economics literature and plays a large and detrimental role in
cutting off critical thought about just when minimization of transaction
costs adequately justifies legal rules.  
For example, take fair use.  We have already pointed out that some
courts have treated evidence of a functioning market for a particular use as
sufficient to defeat a fair use claim - on the theory that high transaction
costs causing market failure do not exist.  But the point that transaction
costs have dropped to a level where they can function in ways that deliver
some benefits to the user and the copyright holder (i.e. that they aid
efficient transactions) cannot tell us whether they are desirable.  To know
this we must know whether other impediments to efficient transactions
exist and whether efficient market mechanisms serve societies’ goals well
in a particular context.
In some situations low transaction costs may not sufficiently justify
abandonment of fair use, even if they do signal the possibility of
transactions.  While it may be relatively costless to obtain a license to
create a parody of an existing copyrighted work, there are several reasons
why such a license should be unnecessary.  First of all, parodies are
creative works and comments on existing work.  The right to comment is
coincident with the right to speak and should not be curtailed by the
copyright owner.   Furthermore, the copyright owner should not be given
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310 See Richard A. Epstein, Let “The Fundamental Things Apply”:  Necessary and
Contingent Truths in Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1311-1312 (2002)
(describing choice between open access and private property a question “central” to the law
of property, including intellectual property).
311 See Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership; or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love Intellectual Property, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 453, 475-482 (2002)(discussing
the importance of distributive justice concerns in copyright law).
312 The importance of this question supports one of the authors’ thesis that the
(continued...)
the right to veto or shape the manner in which the parody is created.   If the
point of the parody is to offer criticism and to provide an important and
otherwise unexpressed gloss on the work, then the creator of the parody
should be free to fashion that expression without the interference of the
copyright owner.  Therefore, even if the costs of obtaining a license from
the copyright owner is relatively low, there are substantive reasons why a
transaction with the owner is undesirable and should be avoided.  Focusing
solely on minimizing transaction costs ignores the reasons to avoid
licensing transactions in the parody fair use context.
Decisions about fair use implicate fundamental institutional choices.
A decision that a use does not fall within the doctrine allows the market, or
more precisely, the copyright holder, to regulate the use.  A would be user
must pay the copyright holder in order to carry out a desired use.  And the
user can employ the power of the state to force a user to desist, unless
carried out within the terms of a license.  A decision that a use falls within
the fair use doctrine’s scope removes that use from the control of the
copyright holder and the market, creating a true laissez-faire situation,
where the user can make use of the material without interference by the
copyright holder or the state.  It is a decision between an open access and
a private property regime.310  
While transaction cost analysis can play some role in such a regime
choice, it cannot by itself determine when fair use is desirable.  Indeed,
Wendy Gordon, a major architect of the transaction cost minimization
approach to this area employs a more nuanced institutional analysis that
considers other factors.  Clearly, decisions about the scope of fair use
implicate equitable considerations.  For example, we may wish to subsidize
education or research by exempting some activities associated with it from
the expense of copyright licensing.311  And the question of fair use
implicates the broader question of whether a free sharing on information or
a regime predicated upon profitable property rights best spurs creativity in
a particular realm.312 
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economic dynamics of law should matter more than efficiency questions to legal theory.
See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003).
313 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F. 3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001)(right to
prevent entry into a derivative market for the copyrighted work); UMG Recordings, Inc.
v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)(copyright owner’s right of first
entry into digital markets for copyrighted work).
The advent of digital technologies makes the issue of the proper role
of transaction cost minimization especially salient.  The point is often made
that in digital environments, the cost of negotiating a copyright license is
low, suggesting that fair use should be fairly narrow or perhaps non-
existent.  In digital environments, courts have seemingly narrowed the
scope of fair use, reasoning that the copyright owner has the right of first
entry into the digital market for copyrighted works.313  However, such
reasoning assumes that transacting with the copyright owner in a low
transaction cost environment facilitates the creation of markets for the
digital versions of the copyrighted work.  This conclusion ignores the issue
of whether courts should limit  copyright owner’s power to shape private
transactions and markets.
In short, analysts must take transaction cost function into account.
Doing so implies that transaction cost reduction is not always justified.
Careful comparative institutional analysis, as described above, will aid
analysis of the question of when elimination might be justified.  Finally, a
caveat, neither transaction costs, nor transaction cost functions, are
everything.  
CONCLUSION
Transaction costs purchase benefits.  This means that we cannot
reflexively reduce transaction costs.  We should replace the automatic 
assumption that transaction cost minimization justifies legal rules with
functional analysis based on information theory as described above.
